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Beyond Cardboard Clients in Legal Ethics
KATHERiNE

R. KRUSE*
ABSTRACT

Historically, legal ethics scholars preoccupied themselves with the moral
conflicts that arise when the pursuit of a client's interests requires a lawyer to
harm innocent third parties, undermine the truth-seeking norms of the legal
system, or both. But is over-zealous loyalty to clients really the most important
issue that plagues legal professionalism? This Article argues that it is not. Rather,
the obsession in legal ethics with the problems of zealous partisanship dates back
to a preference of early legal ethics scholars, most of whom were philosophers, to
focus on conflicts between professional role morality and ordinary morality. To
generate these conflicts, legal ethics scholars had to construct clients as
"cardboard clients"--one dimensional figures interested only in maximizing
their legal and financial interests. Implicit assumptions about cardboard clients
also led these ethicists to propose the problematic solution that lawyers should act
as moral consciences for their clients. The "lawyer-statesman" model that
emerged as an alternative professional ideal rests on the morally elitist
assumption that lawyers are better situated than clients to exercise moral
judgment and carries the danger of moral overreaching when lawyers and clients
disagree about morality.
This Article argues that the construction of such cardboard clients for the
purpose of studying legal ethics disserves legal ethics by obscuring what is
arguably a more central problem of legal professionalism: the problem of legal
objectification. The problem of legal objectification is the tendency of lawyers to
"issue-spot" their clients as they would the facts on a blue book exam,
overemphasizing the clients' legal interests and minimizing or ignoring the other
cares, commitments, relationships, reputations, and values that constitute the
objectives clients bring to legal representation. This Article proposes an
alternative ideal of legal professionalism for "three-dimensional clients" based
on helping clients articulate and actualize their values through the law. This
Article argues that a client value-based model of representation survives the

* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. The following
persons merit special thanks for facilitating invaluable discussion of these ideas and feedback on earlier drafts
this article: Annette Appell, Susan Carle, David Luban, Russell Pearce, Nancy Rapoport, and Ted Schneyer.
This article benefited greatly from presentation at the Law Speakers Series at American University, Washington
College of Law, the Clinical Research Forum at William S. Boyd School of Law, and the Potomac Valley
Writers' Workshop.
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critiques of early legal ethics scholars and provides an antidote against both the
self-seeking behavior that legal objectification promotes and the danger of moral
overreaching associated with the lawyer-statesman model.
In the world of legal ethics, clients are most often constructed as cardboard
figures interested solely in maximizing their own wealth or freedom at the
expense of others.1 Scour any professional responsibility textbook and you will
find examples of the ethical issues that arise when the pursuit of a client's
interests requires a lawyer to harm innocent third parties, undermine the
truth-seeking norms of the legal system, or both. The proliferation of these
examples is no accident. Rather, they arose as a consequence of a choice by early
legal ethicists to focus on the dilemma faced by a lawyer forced by professional
duty to do something that would otherwise be wrong. To generate this kind of
dilemma, legal ethics scholars had to posit hypothetical clients impervious to
ordinary moral considerations, unconcerned with preserving their relationships
with others and indifferent to their reputations in the community.
This Article argues that the reliance on "cardboard clients"--one dimensional
figures who are only concerned with maximizing their legal and financial
interests--disserves legal ethics by obscuring important issues of professional
responsibility that cannot be examined in the simplified world of the standard
professional responsibility hypothetical. Most notably, the reliance on cardboard
clients has disabled legal ethicists from confronting a problem I call "legal
objectification." "Legal objectification" is the tendency of lawyers to view their
clients as walking bundles of legal rights and interests rather than as whole
persons whose legal issues often come deeply intertwined with other concernsrelationships, loyalties, hopes, uncertainties, fears, doubts, and values-that
shape the objectives they bring to legal representation.
The classic case of Spaulding v. Zimmennan can be used to illustrate the
problem of relying on cardboard clients to explore the ethical obligations of
lawyers. 2 In Spaulding, the personal injury lawyer for the defense learned from
his own medical expert that the plaintiff suffered a heart aneurysm probably
caused by the automobile accident at issue in the case.3 The defense lawyer
proceeded to settle the case without ever revealing to the plaintiff that his life was
in danger.4 The Court reopened the settlement two years later when the aneurysm
was discovered in a routine medical examination.5 The court, however, noted in

1. See Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1731, 1737
(1993); Robert Rubinson, Attorney Fct-Finding,EthicalDecision-Makingand the Methodology of Law, 45 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 1185, 1212 (2001).
2. Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962); see also Timothy W. Floyd & John Gallagher,
Legal Ethics, Narrative and Professional Identity: The Story of David Spaulding, 59 MERCER L. REV. 941,
955-57 (2008).
3. Id. at 707.
4. Id. at 708.
5. Id. at 708.
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dicta that "no canon of ethics or legal obligation" required the defense lawyer to
inform the plaintiff of the life-threatening medical condition.6
For almost thirty years, legal ethics scholars have used the dramatic facts of
Spaulding to discuss the boundaries of a lawyer's competing moral and
professional duties when divulging confidential information that could save a
human life. To use Spaulding to explore this moral and ethical dilemma,
however, one must imagine a client who will not consent to disclose the
confidential information. Lawyers are always ethically permitted to reveal
confidential information if the client consents after consultation.8 If the client in
Spaulding consented to reveal the information, perhaps because the client shares
the lawyer's concern for the value of human life, the lawyer's dilemma would
have disappeared.
Upon further examination, the facts behind Spaulding suggest that the client
would have consented to reveal the potentially life-saving information, if his
lawyer had consulted him.9 The litigation in Spaulding arose from a car accident
in the mid-1950s involving three families living in the same rural area of
Minnesota.1 ° The action was brought on behalf of 20-year-old David Spaulding,
a passenger in the car driven by 19-year-old John Zimmerman. 1 When the
accident occurred, Zimmerman was transporting Spaulding and other employees
of his father's road construction business home from a worksite at dusk. Their car
collided with a car occupied by the Ledermann family on their way to the county
fair.12 The accident was a tragic event for all three families. In addition to
seriously injuring David Spaulding, the accident killed 12-year-old Elaine
Ledermann, who was thrown from her car, killed John Zimmerman's brother
James, also a passenger in his car, and broke the neck of John Zimmerman's
father, Edward. 13 Given the close relationship between John Zimmerman and
David Spaulding and the devastating loss his own family had already suffered,
Zimmerman likely would have consented--even wanted-to reveal medical
6. Id. at 710.
7. See Roger C. Cramton & Lori P. Knowles, Professional Secrecy and Its Exceptions: Spaulding v.
Zimmerman Revisited, 83 MNN. L. REV. 63, 65-66, 72 (1998). For many years, the public policy exception to
permit disclosure to prevent harm to others was conditioned on "prevent[ing] the client from committing a
criminalact that was reasonably certain to cause imminent death or substantial bodily harm." MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDucT R. 1.6(b)(1) (1983) (emphasis added). The most recent amendments to the ABA Model Rules
omit the requirement that one's client be criminally culpable and permit disclosure "to prevent reasonably
certain death or substantial bodily harm" regardless of whether the threat to life or bodily security arises from a
criminal act. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 1.6(b)(1) (2007) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].

8. See MODEL RULES R. 1.6(a) ("A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a
client unless the client consents after consultation,except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order
to carry out the representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b).") (emphasis added).
9. Cranton & Knowles, supra note 7, at 94.
10. Id. at 63-64.
11. Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704, 706-07 (Minn. 1962).
12. Cramton & Knowles, supra note 7, at 63.
13. Id. at 64.
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14
information critically important to Spaulding's health and life.
The more interesting moral and ethical question revealed by the facts in
Spaulding is why a lawyer would make the decision not to reveal the confidential
information without even consulting his client. One likely answer is that the
lawyer in Spaulding saw his job as simply to maximize his client's legal and
financial interests and did not consider the effect of the settlement on the client's
other values or relationships. 5 In other words, the lawyer in Spaulding possibly
succumbed to legally objectifying his client, viewing John Zimmerman narrowly
as nothing more than a collection of legal and financial interests disconnected
from the rest of his life.
Legal ethics scholars have not generally explored the problem of legal
objectification revealed in Spaulding, nor could they. To create the dilemma legal
ethics scholars wanted to discuss, John Zimmerman had to be constructed as a
cardboard figure unwilling to reveal confidential information that might increase
the damages for which he was liable. Once Zimmerman is constructed as a
cardboard figure, it is no longer possible to see-much less to confront-the
problem of legal objectification also raised by the case. Such oversight will
always occur when legal ethicists rely on cardboard clients because cardboard
clients are constructed in theory from the very same narrowing assumptions that
create the problem of legal objectification in practice.
The construction of cardboard clients in legal ethics has other theoretical costs.
Relying on the image of cardboard clients, legal ethics scholars have exaggerated
the problem of over-zealous partisanship and proposed solutions that distort the
balance between lawyers' professional obligations to clients and their obligations
to the public. The alternative professional ideal most commonly proposed by
legal ethicists, sometimes called the "lawyer-statesman model," exhorts lawyers
to conform their clients' objectives to the public good even if that means
manipulating or betraying their clients in the process. 1 6 Yet, reasonable persons
often disagree about the content and application of moral standards. Lawyers
who judge their clients' objectives based on moral standards that the clients do
not share can become guilty of moral overreaching. The image of the moral
lawyer responsible for enforcing the public good enables a systemic denial of the
reality-glaringly obvious to non-lawyer observers-that
lawyers often pursue
t 7
clients.
their
of
expense
the
at
self-interest
own
their
This Article seeks to move legal ethics beyond cardboard clients by re-

14. See id. at 94. The authors based this conclusion in part on interviews with surviving members of the
Zimmerman and Ledermann families. Id. at 91-92; see also Floyd & Gallagher, supra note 2, at 947 (describing
how the Lederman and Zimmerman families had little contact or consultation with the lawyers hired by the
insurance companies to represent them).
15. Cramton & Knowles, supra note 7, at 94-96; Floyd & Gallagher, supranote 2, at 954.
16. See infra Part H.C.
17. See infra Part III.E.
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imagining how the ideals of professionalism could have developed if legal ethics
scholars had diagnosed the problem of legal objectification and sought to cure it.
Part I examines the theoretical history of legal ethics at the time of its
post-Watergate fluorescence, showing how the assumptions of moral lawyers and
cardboard clients arose from the way legal ethics scholars initially framed the
interesting issues in legal ethics as conflicts between ordinary morality and role
morality. Part H re-examines the theoretical history of legal ethics to reveal an
early interest inthe problem of legal objectification that was never fully explored
and shows how contemporaneous movements in legal interviewing and counseling literature implicitly addressed the problem of legal objectification. Part I
proposes a model of partisanship for three-dimensional clients that brings these
divergent strands together and places fidelity to client values at the center of a
lawyer's partisan duties. Part IV examines the limitations of the client valuebased model of representation proposed in Part Il in the contexts of representing
diminished capacity clients, representing organizational clients, and pursuing
cause lawyering where mobilization around collective values is necessary to fight
systemic injustice.

I. MORAL LAWYERS

AND CARDBOARD CLIENTS IN LEGAL ETHics

Theoretical interest in legal ethics experienced a fluorescence in the mid18
1970s, and it was a propitious time for theoretical development in the field.
Monroe Freedman was in the midst of a searing campaign to unseat the
orthodoxy and hypocrisy of professional self-regulation.1 9 The American Bar
Association ("ABA") adopted a law school accreditation standard that required
instruction in professional responsibility. 20 Furthermore, the legal profession was
itself undergoing intense self-scrutiny. The ABA was beginning an open, public,
and at times hotly-contested process of re-writing the standards that govern
professional regulation into the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.2 ' The

18. Although I refer to the scholars of this time as the "early legal ethics scholars," I do not mean to suggest
that they were the first generation of scholars to consider legal ethics. The first American scholars to give
thoughtful attention to the ethical obligations of lawyers were Nineteenth Century thinkers David Hoffman and
George Sharswood. See Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers as America's Governing Class: The Formation and
Dissolution of the Original Understandingof the Lawyer's Role, 8 U. Cm. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 381, 388-90
(2001). However, I refer to the scholars of the 1970s as the "early legal ethics scholars" because it was their
scholarship that entrenched legal ethics as a field of legal scholarship within the legal academy.
19. Monroe H. Freedman, ProfessionalResponsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest
Questions, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 1469, 1469, n.1 (1966); MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHIcS IN AN
ADVERSARY SYSTEM vii-viii (1975); see also William H. Simon, "Thinking Like a Lawyer" About Legal Ethics,
27 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 1 (1998) (describing the impact of Freedman's work).
20. David Luban, Calming the Hearse Horse:A PhilosophicalResearch Programfor Legal Ethics, 40 MD.
L. REv. 451,452-53 (1981); David Luban, Reason and Passionin Legal Ethics, 51 STAN. L. REv. 873, 878-79
(1999).
21. In 1969, the ABA replaced the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics with the Code of Professional
Responsibility. In 1977, the ABA appointed a Commission on the Evaluation of Professional Standards chaired
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Kutak Commission, which took on the task of drafting the Model Rules, was
conscious of the need to rehabilitate the public image of lawyers and was
deliberately solicitous of academic critique as a source of guidance in the early
stages of its rule-making process.22
The initial foray by moral philosophers into legal ethics was launched by
philosopher Richard Wasserstrom's 1975 essay, Lawyers as Professionals:Some
Moral Issues.2 3 In the decade or so that followed, a host of moral philosophers
and legal scholars weighed in on the theoretical questions of how to justify
lawyers' professional behavior.24 Looking back on the earliest moral philosophical essays in legal ethics, David Luban commented that the early scholars,
"inaugurated a new approach to legal ethics ... that centers on the issue of role
morality and its conflict with universal morality., 25 As Part II of this Article will
demonstrate, however, the conflict between professional role morality and
universal morality was not the only way that the important moral questions in
legal practice could have been framed. Wasserstrom's earliest essay raised a
concern-arguably at the center of his critique of legal professionalism-that
lawyers tend to objectify their clients in terms of their clients' legal interests,
which I am calling the "problem of legal objectification."
This Part will explore how moral theory developed away from Wasserstrom's
diagnosis of legal objectification as a central moral problem of legal professionalism and came to rely in theory on the same kind of legal objectification that

by Robert Kutak to recommend revisions to the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility. Between 1977 and 1983,
the Kutak Commission engaged the profession and the public in an unprecedented process of ethical reform,
circulating four drafts of its own re-formulation of the Code into the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
STEPHEN GILLERS & RoY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 3 (2001 ed.).
22. See Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 677, 677 (1989).
23. Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals:Some Moral Issues, 5 HuM. RTs. 1 (1975).
24. In 1976, philosopher Charles Fried published a philosophical defense of the morality of the lawyer-client
relationship as a "special-purpose friendship." Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundationsof
the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976). These two articles set the agenda for further discussion
in the field of philosophy. Luban, Reason and Passion,supra note 20, at 878-79. Other early articles included
Monroe H. Freedman, PersonalResponsibility in a ProfessionalSystem, 27 CATH. U. L. REv. 191 (1978);
Warren Lehman, The Pursuitof a Client's Interests, 77 MIcH. L. REv. 1078 (1979); David Luban, Paternalism
and the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 454; David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative:A Response to
Stephen Pepper, 1986 Am. B. FouND. RES. J. 637; Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyers Amoral Ethical Role: A
Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 613; Gerald J. Postema, Moral
Responsibility in ProfessionalEthics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63 (1980); Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy'sStandard
Misconception of Legal Ethics, 1984 WIs. L. REv. 1529; Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and
Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REv. 669, 673 (1978); Thomas L. Shaffer, Christian Theories of
ProfessionalResponsibility,48 S. CAL. L. REV. 721, 722-23 (1975); Thomas Shaffer, The Practice of Law as a
MoralDiscourse, 55 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 231 (1979); William H. Simon, The Ideology ofAdvocacy, 1978 Wis.
L. REv. 29; William H. Simon, Homo Psychologicus:Notes on a New Legal Formalism,32 STAN. L. REv. 487
(1980); William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REv. 469 (1984); William H.
Simon, EthicalDiscretionin Lawyering, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1083 (1988); see also essays collected in THE GOOD
LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' EThics (David Luban ed., 1983).
25. Luban, Reason and Passion,supra note 20, at 878-79.
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Wasserstrom condemned in practice: the cardboard construction of clients
defined solely by the maximization of their legal interests.
A. ZEAL AT THE MARGIN AS A ROLE MORALITY FOR LAWYERS
The most important force in defining and solidifying the study of legal ethics
as an academic discipline came from the Working Group on Legal Ethics
("Working Group").2 6 This group of leading moral philosophers, legal scholars,
and practitioners met in 1981 and 1982 to present and discuss a series of papers at
the University of Maryland's Center for Philosophy and Public Policy ("Center").27 David Luban, then a young research associate at the Center, devised an
ambitious research agenda for the Working Group of "hard, unsolved, and mostly
in legal ethics that are amenable to treatment by moral
unexplored issues
28
philosophy.",
Much of the research agenda for the Working Group centered on the question
of what lawyers should do when their professional duties require them to take or
condone actions they would otherwise consider immoral. 2 9 The essays resulting
from the Working Group's discussions were published in 1984 in an influential
edited volume called The Good Lawyer.30 The basic premise of this volume was
to examine not the nature of lawyers' ethical lapses, but whether "the professional
ideal is itself morally worthy."'', As philosopher Charles Fried articulated it in an
early article, the question was whether "a good lawyer [can] be a good person. 3 2
The philosophers who explored the question of whether a good lawyer could
be a good person framed the issue in terms of conflicts between a lawyer's
professional "role morality" and the obligations of "ordinary morality."33 As
defined by moral philosophers, a "role morality" is a set of norms that apply to us
in the various social roles we occupy in life-parent, soldier, lawyer-that are

26. The Working Group was built on a foundation laid in 1977 when the Council for Philosophical Studies
held an Institute on Law and Ethics. Conversation with David Luban, Professor of Law, Georgetown University
Law Center (Washington D.C., Mar. 23, 2007).
27. Preface to THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 24, at vii. The Working Group included philosophers Richard
Wasserstrom, Gerald Postema, and Bernard Williams, who had already contributed to moral theory in legal
ethics. See Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals,supra note 23, at 1; Postema, Moral Responsibility, supra
note 24, at 63; Bernard Williams, Politics and Moral Character,in WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK: PHILOSOPHICAL
PAPERS 1973-1980 54, 63-66 (1981). It included legal ethics scholars Charles Wolfram and Murray Schwartz. It
also included Robert Kutak, who was at that time chairing the ABA commission drafting the Model Rules of
ProfessionalResponsibility. See Preface to THE GOOD LAWYER, supra, at viii.
28. Luban, Calming the Hearse Horse,supra note 20, at 452.
29. Id. at 456, 462. The other, less prominent, questions involved the provision of legal services to indigents.
Id. at 471-73.
30. THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 24.

31. David Luban, Introductionto, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supranote 24, at 1.
32. Fried, supranote 24, at 1060.
33. Luban, Introduction,supra note 31, at 1.
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narrower than the norms of ordinary morality that apply to all of us as persons.3 4
What makes the situation of role morality complicated from a philosophical point
of view is that even while we are occupying a social role, we are still persons
subject to ordinary moral obligations. 35 The important and interesting question
from the perspective of moral philosophy was how to resolve conflicts between
what is right for us to do in our professional roles and what is morally right for us
to do as persons.3 6
Because moral philosophers sought to frame the important and interesting
questions in legal ethics in terms of conflicts between role morality and ordinary
morality, their first order of business was to define lawyers' role morality in terms
that would create such conflicts. The task of articulating a morally problematic
"role morality" for lawyers was accomplished through articulating and critiquing
the "standard conception" of the lawyer's role, defined by principles of
partisanship and neutrality. 37 As defined in the early legal ethical writings, the
principle of partisanship requires lawyers to maximize their clients' objectives
"within, but all the way up to the limits of the law."' 38 The principle of neutrality
relieves lawyers of moral responsibility for the harmful effects on others of
actions taken in pursuit of their clients' objectives.3 9 Under the standard
conception, a lawyer's professional behavior is constrained only by two
parameters: the client's objectives and the limits of the law.4 0 Notably, the
standard conception does not include independent moral responsibility for
furthering the public good or for regarding the rights or interests of individuals
who might be harmed by the legal representation. 4' Under the standard
conception, such considerations are not within the lawyer's job description. The
responsibility of ensuring that justice emerges from the clash of competing
partisan views of the law and facts in a case is placed on the "broader institutional
shoulders" of the adversary system itself.4 2 Moral philosophers posited that this
combination of partisan loyalty and moral neutrality lay at the root of the
34. See Richard Wasserstrom, Roles and Morality, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 24, at 25; DAVID
LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JusTIcE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 104-27 (1988). But see Bernard Williams, Professional
Morality and Its Dispositions, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 24, at 259, 259-62 (arguing that it is more
helpful and less misleading to consider such conflicts in terms of the dispositions that professionals acquire as a
result of their education and training).
35. LuBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 34, at 105-16.
36. wasserstrom, Roles and Morality, supra note 34, at 25-29.
37. Different authors have called the principles by different names and defined the principles slightly
differently. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JuSTICE, supra note 34, at 7. For different formulations, see Postema, Moral
Responsibility, supra note 24, at 73; Schwartz, Professionalism and Accountability, supra note 24, at 673;
Simon, Ideology ofAdvocacy, supra note 24, at 36.
38. Postema, Moral Responsibility, supra note 24, at 73.
39. Id. at 73; Schwartz, Professionalism and Accountability, supra note 24, at 673; Simon, Ideology of
Advocacy, supra note 24, at 36.
40. Postema, Moral Responsibility,supra note 24, at 74.
41. WILLIAM IL SIMON, THE PRAcrlCE OF JuSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHICS 8 (1998).

42. Postema, Moral Responsibility,supra note 24, at 64.
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problems of legal professionalism.
To create tension between role morality and ordinary morality, moral theorists
gave the "limits of the law" and "client objective" parameters a particular and
extreme interpretation. The "limits of the law" parameter was interpreted broadly
to embrace any colorable interpretation that the law can arguably sustain-a style
of interpretation David Luban called "zeal at the margin."4 3 Lawyers who

advocate zealously at the margin of the law do not engage in good faith
interpretation of the law, but treat legal limits instrumentally, looking for ways
around or loopholes through them." Accordingly, they push the "limits of the
law" that are meant to constrain the pursuit of their clients' interests "well past
whatever moral and political insight constitutes the 'spirit' of the law in
question." 4 5 Defined in these terms, the "limits of the law" are not really limits at
46
all; they are challenges to the cleverness and gamesmanship of lawyers.
Because "zeal at the margin" was defined as pushing law beyond moral limits, the
pursuit of "zeal at the margin" was virtually guaranteed to generate conflicts
between role morality and ordinary morality.
Lawyers, however, cannot get out to the margin of the law and morality on
their own. The standard conception defines a lawyer's partisan duties as the loyal
pursuit of a client's objectives. 47 A lawyer is unlikely to experience conflicts
between ordinary and role morality when representing altruistic clients whose
objectives include "doing the right thing" and treating others fairly. Even clients
who are motivated primarily by self-interest but still care about containing
litigation costs, preserving long-standing business relationships with present
adversaries, or maintaining their reputations in the community will have an
interest in avoiding the far reaches of "zeal at the margin."4 8 To push lawyers out
to the margin where the philosophically interesting conflicts arise, legal ethicists
had to construct clients whose objectives were defined solely in terms of
maximizing their legal interests-their wealth, freedom, or power over others-in disregard of the consequences to others and in disregard of their own
long-term relationship and reputational interests.
Only by equating "zeal at the margin" with being a "good lawyer" can the
critiques raised by early legal ethics scholars become critiques of legal
professionalism, rather than critiques of bad lawyering. If a good person could be
a good lawyer most of the time, the conflicts between role morality and ordinary
morality would materialize in only exceptional cases. Furthermore, a critique of
43. DAVID LutAN, The Adversary System Excuse, in LEGAL EThics AND HUMAN DIGNrrY 19, 26 (2007)
("[Z]ealous advocacy always means zeal at the margin.").
44. Id. at 25-26; LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTncE, supra note 34, at 16-17.
45. Luban, Adversary System Excuse, supranote 43, at 26.
46. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JusTicE, supra note 34, at 17.
47. Postema, Moral Responsibility, supra note 24, at 73; MODEL RULES R. 1.2(a) (a lawyer is to abide by a
client's decision regarding the objectives of representation).
48. See Ted Schneyer, Some Sympathy for the Hired Gun, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 11, 26-27 (1991).
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the exceptional case does not serve the theoretical purpose of demonstrating how
the professional ideal itself, the "role morality" of lawyers, is morally corrupt.
B. CRITIQUES OF THE STANDARD CONCEPTION
Moral theorists mounted essentially two critiques of the standard conception,
one of which focused on the viability of public policy justifications for lawyers'
partisan dedication to their clients' interests and the other of which focused on
whether lawyers who practiced according to the standard conception could
themselves be good persons. These critiques, however, depended for their force
and vitality on a vision of lawyers who push the law as far as it could go out of
loyalty to cardboard clients bent on wrongdoing and unable to be persuaded off
that course.
1.

THE "ADVERSARY SYSTEM EXCUSE" CRITIQUE

Early moral theoretical writings questioned the adequacy of traditional appeals
to the adversary system to justify lawyers' representation of morally reprehensible clients or the use of morally questionable tactics. 49 Adversarial partisan
ethics are traditionally justified by arguing that the zealous pursuit of a client's
interests ultimately serves public goals even if it produces what seems like
injustice in the situation at hand.5 ° This traditional view of the adversary system,
into which members of the legal profession are socialized, is defended by
utilitarian arguments that adversarial testing leads to more accurate truth-finding,
procedural justice arguments about the. power of adversarial proceedings in
effectuating the legitimacy of law, and the consonance of partisan representation
with liberal democratic values of individual autonomy, dignity, and fairness.5 1
Moral theorists responded that the standard conception and its endorsement of
instrumental manipulation of the law to maximize a client's legal interests may
accurately capture a lawyer's moral duties in some kinds of legal practice, most
notably criminal defense.52 The moral theorists contended, however, that lawyers
wrongly invoke arguments based on the adversary system even outside the

49. Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals,supra note 23, at 12.
50. The most prominent early example is FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETIcs, supra note 19.
51. See generally MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMrrH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHics 13-43 (3d ed.

2004) (cataloguing systemic arguments in favor of adversarial ethics); Pepper, Ethical Role, supra note 24.
52. Moral theorists generally have excused criminal defense lawyers from ordinary moral obligations, noting
the different public policies at stake in criminal defense. See, e.g., David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders
Different?,91 MicH. L. REv. 1729 (1993); Murray L. Schwartz, On Making the True Look False and the False
Look True, 41 Sw. L.J. 1135, 1141 (1988). But see William H. Simon, The Ethics of CriminalDefense, 91 MICH.
L. REv. 1703 (1993).
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contexts in which partisan zeal is justified, such as non-litigation settings 5 3 and
civil litigation between private parties. 54 In the best-known and most sustained
theoretical critique of the lawyer's partisan role, David Luban systematically
critiqued arguments that the adversary system was the best way to determine
truth, the best way to protect legal rights, or the best way to reflect society's
commitment to enhancing personal autonomy and protecting human dignity.55
Rather than relying on blanket appeals to the "adversary system excuse" to
justify their behavior, Luban argued that lawyers should take into account the
moral justifications for their adversarial role and weigh the strength of those
justifications against the moral harm that adhering to the role would cause.56
Where a lawyer represents an individual squaring off against the state or a
powerful institution, exemplified by the paradigm of criminal defense, Luban
argued that the moral justifications for the adversary system are strong and
typically require "the kind of partisan zeal characterized in the standard
conception." 5 7 Where clients possess power equal to or greater than their
opponents, however, the adversary system is only weakly justified by the
pragmatic argument that it "seems to do as good a job as any at finding truth and
protecting legal rights," and because it is the system we already have.5 8 Because
the adversary system is so weakly justified in such cases, he concluded, it
"doesn't excuse much more than the most minor deviations from common
59

morality.",

Though theoretically valid, Luban's critique of the "adversary system excuse"
depended for its force on images of lawyers who manipulate the law, the facts,
and the rules that govern their own behavior. For example, in critiquing the
consequentialist argument that the adversary system is the best way to ascertain

53. Schwartz, Professionalismand Accountability, supra note 24, at 669 (arguing that justifications based on
the adversary system do not hold in non-litigation contexts, such as negotiating and counseling, in which the
corrective backstop of an impartial arbiter in missing).
54. Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 24, at 150
(lawyers in civil cases should be held morally accountable for the objectives of the clients they choose to
represent and whether the tactics they employ assist or undermine the ascertainment of truth).
55. The critique was initially laid out in Luban's own contribution to THE GOOD LAWYER, entitled The
Adversary System Excuse, which has been reprinted in a recent volume of essays, LEGAL ETMcs AND HUMAN
DIGNTrY, supranote 43. This essay was refined and expanded to cover five chapters of his book, LAWYERS AND
JusTicE. LuBAN, LAWYERS AND JusricE, supra note 34. William Simon has developed a similar critique of
traditional justifications for adversary ethics. See SIMON, PRACTnCE OF JUSTIcE, supranote 41.
56. This weighing involves a four-step process, which is explained in detail in LUBAN, LAWYERS AND
JusicE, supra note 34, at 128-47.
57. Id. at 148.
58. Id. at 92. Luban suggests that lawyers in civil cases would be enjoined from deceitful practices and from
inflicting "morally unjustifiable damage on other people." Id. at 157. They may not take exception from the
general moral obligation of obedience to the law by manipulating the law "to achieve outcomes that negate its
generality or violate its spirit." Id. Also, they may not pursue legally permissible but "substantively unjust
results." Id.
59. Id. at 149.
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truth, he conjured the image of the zealous advocate who starts with the story that
best serves the client's legal interests, and "reasons backwards to what the facts
must be, dignifies this fantasy by labeling it her 'theory of the case,' and then
cobbles together whatever evidence can be used to support this 'theory." '' 60 The
problem with this kind of advocacy, he argued, is that it starts from the
"standpoint of the client's interests" rather than from the client's actual
perspective. 61 Setting up one manipulative and misleading version of the facts
against another equally manipulative and misleading version of the facts was
more likely to result in obfuscation and confusion than the determination of
62

truth.

Luban's argument against the claim that the adversary system is the best way to
protect legal rights proceeded along a similar course. He conceded that
individuals in society may need adversarial counsel to vindicate legitimate legal
rights; however, he argued, invoking both "zeal at the margin" and cardboard
clients, this need does not support "[t]he no-holds-barred zealous advocate [who]
tries to get everything the law can give (if that is the client's wish). 63 When
lawyers use "tricks of the trade" like delay tactics or driving up costs to gain a
settlement, they are infringing their opponents' rights, not vindicating their
clients' rights. 64
Luban's critiques of zealous partisanship also invoked the image of cardboard
clients to discredit the notion that promoting individual autonomy and human
dignity has intrinsic moral worth. The moral worth of pursuing autonomy or
protecting dignity, he argued, derives from the goodness of the clients a lawyer
represents. Appeals to autonomy cannot justify lawyers in helping individuals
use their freedom under the law to cause unjustifiable harm and violate the
autonomy of others. 65 Likewise, honoring a client's human dignity by providing
her with an advocate to tell her story is good only insofar as the lawyer tells the
client's story in good faith.6 6 Lawyers who use the law to help clients bully
others, manipulate legal processes, or deliberately distort the facts cannot rely on
appeals to autonomy and dignity to justify the adversary system's "peculiar
requirement of one-sided zeal at the margin of the legal and the moral. 67
2.

THE ROLE DISPOSION CRITIQUE

Although the "adversary system excuse" critique focused on the adequacy of

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 73.
Id.
Id. at 68-74.
Id. at 75.
Id.
See id. at 82-83; see also Luban, LysistratianPrerogative,supranote 24.

66. LuaBA, LAWyERS ANt JusncE, supra note 34, at 86-87.

67. Id. at 84.
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public policy justifications for adversarial zeal, the second critique was concerned primarily with what Daniel Markovits has called "legal ethics from the
lawyer's point of view.' 68 From the lawyer's point of view, the issue is not how to
justify role-differentiated behavior to the rest of society, but how lawyers
personally cope with the moral wrongs that their profession requires them to
commit. 6 9 What is at stake is the lawyer's personal integrity or ability to live
according
to values that he has chosen and can endorse as part of a coherent life
70
plan.
The role disposition theorists' critique draws on a tradition pioneered by
philosopher Bernard Williams, which focuses on the way moral agents experience moral obligation. 7 1 As a philosopher, Williams is known for his colorful
examples illustrating the internal experience of morality: a lorry driver who
accidentally runs over a young child 72 and the plight of Jim, a man forced by a
military dictator to personally execute an innocent villager to prevent the dictator
from executing twenty innocents.7 3 Williams's philosophical work builds on the
strongly intuitive notion that our moral concerns in these situations cannot be
fully expiated by telling us that the moral harm we cause, injuring a child by
74
accident or executing an innocent person under coercion, is not really our fault.
A theory that delivers the answer that causing such harm "is not morally wrong"
is incomplete because it fails to capture the moral experience of acting, or being
forced to act, contrary to one's own values.
Legal ethics scholars have used Williams's examples of the lorry driver and
Jim and the villagers as analogies for the situation of lawyers whose professional
role obligations require them to act contrary to ordinary moral obligations.7 5 The
problem with the standard conception, these scholars argued, is that it defines a
68. Daniel Markovits, Legal Ethicsfrom the Lawyer's Point of View, 15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 209 (2003).
69. See id. at 220.
70. Id. at 223.
71. See B.A.O. Williams, Ethical Consistency, in PRACTICAL REASONING 91 (Joseph Raz ed., 1978)
(discussing the nature of conflicts between one's own competing moral judgments); Bernard Williams, Moral
Luck, in WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK, supra note 27, at 27 (discussing the phenomenon of "agent-regret" we feel
upon causing harm accidentally); Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism,in J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD

WILLIAMS, UnLrARtrANSM: FOR AND AGAINST (1973) (describing the failure of utilitarianism to capture the
moral experience of being required to commit a moral wrong in order to optimize moral outcomes).
72. Williams, Moral Luck, in WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK, supranote 27, at 28.
73. Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism,supra note 71, at 98.
74. For example Williams argues that the lorry driver should feel a special kind of "agent-regret" that is
different from the regret felt by a spectator who witnessed the accident. Williams, Moral Luck, in WILLIAMS,
MORAL LUCK, supranote 27, at 28. Likewise, although Jim would be morally justified in accepting the dictator's
invitation-and Jim might even be morally self-indulgent if he refused it-killing an innocent villager by his
own hand still alienates Jim from himself and from projects close to the center of his moral personality in a way
that observing someone else commit the deed would not.
75. See, e.g., Postema, Moral Responsibility, supra note 24, at 68-69 (discussing the lorry driver example);
Markovits, supra note 68, at 225-41 (extended analysis of Williams's example of Jim and the Villagers as
applied to lawyers). Williams himself suggested that the creation of a professional class of amoral lawyers was
perhaps a necessary evil that society tolerates because lawyers need to get their hands dirty if they are to get their
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"good lawyer" as a lawyer who can carry out partisan duties without experiencing personal moral qualms, and it thus encourages lawyers to embrace moral
detachment in their professional work.7 6 Following in Williams's tradition, the
legal ethics scholars argued that moral detachment is ultimately an ineffective.
strategy for coping with the deviations from ordinary morality that lawyers'
professional role requires because it creates a disposition toward amorality that
aggravates the level of harm that lawyers are willing to visit on others and is
ultimately unsatisfying to lawyers themselves.7 7
Although Luban was clear in both defining "zeal at the margin" and directing
his critique of adversary ethics against it, role disposition theorists. did little to
spell out the conditions that pose threats to lawyers' personal integrity. Role
disposition theorists relied instead on vague assertions that legal representation
requires lawyers to engage in unspecified "knavery, ' 78 or "require lawyers to lie,
to cheat and to abuse."7 9 These theorists further claimed that a lawyer's personal
integrity is put at issue by the very fact of legal representation because legal
representation necessarily requires lawyers to disingenuously present legal and
factual claims they do not personally believe. 80
As critics have noted, however, the sweeping characterization of legal
representation as "lying, cheating, and abusing" can be made only by stripping
lawyers' acts from the contexts in which they are performed.8 1 Understood within
the rules and expectations that govern the practice of law, many of the tactics that
moral theorists target would not ordinarily be considered lying or cheating.8 2 In
fact, some of the more abusive tactics cited by legal ethics scholars, such as
asking invasive and embarrassing questions at a deposition, arguably cannot be
understood outside the context of legal representation at all. 83 Moreover, in

jobs done. See Bernard Williams, Politicsand Moral Character,in WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK, supra note 27, at

54, 63-66; Bernard Williams, ProfessionalMorality,supra note 34, at 266.
76. Postema, Moral Responsibility, supranote 24, at 78.
77. Gerald J. Postema, Self-Image, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 24, at 306 (arguing that professional
detachment leads to a life characterized by "confusion, contradiction and self-deception"); cf Postema, Moral
Responsibility, supra note 24, at 68-69 (arguing that morally detached lawyers come to view the harm they
cause as if they were spectators rather than participants).
78. See id. at 63; Postema, Self-Image, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 24, at 288. Postema himself
expressed doubt about the claim that "knavery" is a regular aspect of legal representation, adopting the
characterization for purposes of argument, but noting his own view that the claim is "exaggerated and too often
romanticized." Id. at 288.
79. Markovits, supra note 68, at 217-19.
80. Postema, Moral Responsibility, supra note 24, at 77; Markovits, supranote 68, at 218.
81. Ted Schneyer, The Promise and Problematicsof Legal Ethicsfrom the Lawyer's Pointof View, 16 YALE
J.L. & HuMAN. 45,61-63 (2004).
82. Id. at 62-63.
83. W. Bradley Wendel, Public Values and ProfessionalResponsibility, 75 NoTRE DAME L. Rav. 1, 29 (1999)
("[I]t is almost impossible to think of a relevantly similar case that would arise in everyday moral life, where an
agent was duty-bound to ask embarrassing questions of complete strangers, while the strangers were absolutely
required to answer them."). Williams's own view was that it was difficult to talk about divergences between
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Williams's examples, the extremity of the moral harm creates the threat to the
agent's personal identity.84 A lawyer who found her client's version of the facts
plausible would be hard-pressed to claim that her personal integrity was placed in
jeopardy by the fact of legal representation itself.
The role disposition theorists' claim that adherence to lawyers' professional
role necessarily threatens lawyers' personal integrity begins to make sense only if
we imagine that lawyers routinely represent clients with goals that transgress
ordinary moral bounds.8 5 Like the critique of the "adversary system excuse," the
role disposition theorists' critique is based on an implicit reliance on cardboard
clients who push their lawyers up to and past the limits of the law.
C. MORAL LAWYERS AS THE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL
PROFESSIONALISM
Although the critiques of traditional partisanship proceeded along two tracks,
the "adversary system excuse" and the effect of legal representation on lawyers'
moral characters, they converged on a common solution: lawyers should reject
the moral neutrality inherent in the standard conception and draw on their
independent moral judgment to reign in their partisan advocacy. The purpose of
importing ordinary moral considerations into legal representation was to
supplement the parameters defining professional behavior under the standard
conception-client objectives and the limits of the law-with additional
constraints based on the assessments of right and wrong that lawyers would make
outside their professional roles.
Luban's alternative ideal of professionalism, which he called moral activism,
imposed on lawyers the moral responsibility to "break role" in compelling moral
circumstances to respond to the human pathos of those on whom harm would be
visited as a result of adhering to professional role obligations.86 To address the
deleterious effects of the standard conception on lawyers' moral characters,
Gerald Postema made the similar suggestion that lawyers should replace the
standard conception's strategies of moral detachment with the exercise of

ordinary morality and role morality by focusing on lawyers' actions because "the same act can be acceptable in
some contexts and not in others." Williams, ProfessionalMorality, supra note 34, at 260-61.
84. Postema, Moral Responsibility, supra note 24, at 75 ("[A]s the moral distance between private and
professional moralities increases, the temptation to adopt one or the other extreme strategy of identification also
increases: one either increasingly identifies with the role or seeks resolutely to detach oneself from it.");
Williams, ProfessionalMorality, supra note 34, at 263-64.
85. See Markovits, supra note 68, at 262-63 (arguing that it is the routine and habitual nature of lawyers'
wrongdoing, rather than its severity, that erodes a lawyer's moral character).
86. Luban calls this the "morality of acknowledgment." LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 34, at

127; see also David Luban, Freedomand Constraintin Legal Ethics:Some Mid-Course Correctionsto Lawyers
and Justice, 49 MD. L. REV. 424, 451-52 (1990) (clarifying that the duty to "break role" in compelling moral
circumstances captured the truest essence of his alternative ideal of moral activism).
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"engaged moral judgment., 87 Rather than viewing their role as fixed by the
standard conception of neutral partisanship, he advocated that lawyers cultivate
"mature, responsible moral judgment in the[ir] professional activities, 8 8 drawing on a broad range of "ordinary moral beliefs, attitudes, feelings, and
relationships. 8 9
Although the prospect of lawyers exercising responsible moral judgment
sounds unobjectionable, even appealing, moral theorists imported it into their
alternative ideals of professionalism along with problematic assumptions about
lawyers and clients. As discussed above, to create the kind of dilemmas they
wanted to discuss, moral theorists assumed that clients were basically selfinterested and uncaring toward others. In formulating their solution, the moral
'theorists made the opposite assumption about lawyers, whom they posited as
primarily motivated to lead moral lives and pursue the public interest. The
alternative ideal of professionalism that emerged from these assumptions of
moral lawyers and cardboard clients positioned lawyers as the moral and social
conscience of legal representation, providing a necessary check on the selfseeking behavior of their clients.
When he first introduced his solution to the critique of the "adversary system
excuse," David Luban was skeptical that holding lawyers morally accountable
,would have much of an impact on the profession. "Lawyers get paid for their
services, not for their consciences," he wrote, "and criticizing an ideology won't
change the world."9 ° In later writings, he increasingly came to identify moral
activism with an alternative ideal historically situated within legal professionalism. 9 1 He connected moral activism with a "noblesse oblige" tradition rooted in
the functionalist sociology of Talcott Parsons and the progressive politics of
Louis Brandeis, which viewed lawyers as public servants mediating between
clients' self-interest and the public good.92
The vision of "gentleman lawyers" or "lawyer-statesmen" who act as buffers
between self-interested clients and the public good gained currency in legal
ethics in the decades following Luban's articulation of the moral activist ideal.9 3
Some legal ethics scholars trace the roots of this vision to a republican notion of
lawyers as a "virtuous elite" whose professional autonomy and freedom from
87.
88.
89.
90.

Postema, Moral Responsibility,supra note 24, at 83 (emphasis in the original).
Id.; Postema, Self-Image, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supranote 24, at 289.
Postema, Moral Responsibility,supra note 24, at 78.
LUBAN, Adversary System Excuse, supra note 43, at 63-64.

91. LurAN,LAWYERS AND JusTIcE, supra note 34, at 160.

92. David Luban, The Noblesse Oblige Traditionin the Practiceof Law, 41 VAND. L. REv. 717, 739 (1988)
(the lawyer is "a buffer who mediates between illegitimate client desires and the social interest"). For a similar
view, see generally William H. Simon, Babbitt v. Brandeis: The Decline of the ProfessionalIdeal, 37 STAN. L.
REV.565 (1985).
93. See, e.g.,
ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993);
Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REv. 1, 11-19 (1988); Russell G. Pearce,
Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics Code, 6 GEo. J. LEGAL EThics 241, 250-56 (1992).
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market forces position them well to secure the goods that would allow society to
flourish.94 Others posit that lawyers' professional training and experience endow

them with superior capacities of deliberation and practical judgment that
specially equip them for the role of wise counselors. 95 The very notion of
professionalism has been understood by some as an attempt to recapture in
neutral and egalitarian terms a "gentleman's ethic" more characteristic of a
bygone age in which lawyers were recognized as "America's aristocracy." 96
As critics are quick to point out, however, the image of the "gentleman lawyer"
has profoundly inegalitarian roots in elitist practices that historically excluded
women, blacks, Jews, and Eastern European immigrants from the profession of
law.97 The biggest challenge for those who hearken back to the lawyer-statesman
ideal is whether the vision of the lawyer-statesman in egalitarian terms can be
recast, or whether elitism is an inherent part of the vision.
When you play out the picture of moral activist lawyers who "take it upon
themselves to judge and shape client projects" to fit the common good, 98 the
problems begin to become apparent. For example, lawyers following Luban's
"moral activist" model of client counseling will employ increasingly intrusive
techniques that begin with appealing to clients' consciences and inventing
alternative ways for clients to satisfy their interests. If those tactics do not
dissuade the client, moral activist lawyers may go on to mislead clients by
emphasizing or exaggerating the probability of negative consequences of an
immoral course of action or threatening to withdraw, which would cost the client
money and perhaps even legal representation. If all else fails, the lawyer will
betray the client by acting in accordance with the lawyer's own values, even over
the client's objection. 99

In a particularly heavy-handed description of moral activist representation,
Luban describes the "lawyer for the damned" who "takes on cases that no one
else will come near, cases in which the client has for one reason or another rightly
become odious or untouchable in the eyes of mankind." 1°° In accepting
representation of such odious clients, the lawyer "attempt[s] not merely to save
the client from the consequences of her deeds but to transform and redeem
her."' ' Luban followed his discussion of lawyers "transforming and redeeming"
their clients by extolling a 1905 speech in which Louis Brandeis commended the

94. Pearce, supranote 93, at 250-56; Gordon, supra note 93, at 14-16.
95. KRoNmAN,supra note 93, at 115-16.
96. THoMAs L. SHAFFER & MARY M. SHAFFER, AMERicAN LAWYERS AND THEIR CoMMUNImES: ETmcs INTHE
LEGAL PROFESSION 48-49 (1991); see also Pearce, supra note 93, at 250-56; Gordon, supra note 93, at 16-19.
97. W. Bradley Wendel, Nonlegal Regulation of the Legal Profession: Social Norms in Professional
Communities, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1955, 2025-28 (2001); SHAFFER & SHAFFER, supranote 96, at 48-49.
98. Luban, Noblesse Oblige Tradition,supra note 92, at 737-38.
99. Id.; LuRAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 34, at 173-74.
100. Id. at 162.
101. Id. (emphasis added).
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superior practical wisdom of lawyers, which Brandeis suggested endowed
lawyers with "a position materially
different from that of other men ...
10 2
men."
of
adviser
the
of
the position
The combination of evangelism and elitism in these references paints a rather
frightening picture of the lawyer-client relationship, and to his credit, Luban has
explicitly disclaimed its most disturbing aspects. Lawyers, he has suggested, are
not "more virtuous, decent courageous or compassionate than the rest of us" but
have "the same moral insight as anyone else."' 10 3 Moreover, he has insisted, the
heart of moral activist client counseling is best described as "discussing with the
client the rightness and wrongness of her projects and the possible impact of
those projects on 'the people' in the same matter-of-fact and (one hopes)
unmoralistic manner that one discusses the financial aspects of a representation."'" Other legal ethics scholarship has endorsed similarly less heavy-handed
visions of moral counseling, in which lawyers discuss the moral implications of a
client's options as a matter of course, raising questions as to whether the client's
proposed courses of action would be "right" or "fair." 10 5 To raise these questions,
however, seems to beg them. It is not common to question the rightness or
fairness of a course of action in ordinary conversation unless one is experiencing
moral qualms about pursuing it.
Moreover, however benignly the goals of moral activist counseling are stated,
the moral activist approach has an inherent tendency to veer in the direction of
moral elitism. 106 To defend moral activism as a method for correcting the course
of an errant client, one has to explain why lawyers are better situated than their
clients to exercise responsible moral judgment in legal representation. Moral
theorists face a major obstacle in that regard. Ordinary morality applies to us
because we are persons, and lawyers and clients are on an equal moral footing as

102. Id. at 170, quoting Louis D. Brandeis, Opportunityin the Law.
103. LuBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supranote 34, at 171.
104. David Luban, Partisanship,Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-ClientRelationship, 90 COLuM. L.
REV. 1004, 1026 (1990), quoting LuBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 34, at 173. He clarified that the
references to lawyers "transforming and redeeming" their clients were meant for the special case of the "odious
or untouchable" client and did not represent the heart of his view of client counseling. Luban, Partisanship,
Betrayal and Autonomy, supra, at 1025. And, he cautioned that lawyers should remain open to the "possibility
that it is the lawyer rather than the client who will eventually modify her moral stance." LuBAN, LAWYERS AND
JUSTICE, supra note 34, at 174.
105. For examples, see THoMAs L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS AND MORAL
RESPONsIEn.rrY (2d ed. 2009); Bruce A. Green & Russell L. Pearce, "PublicService Must Begin at Home ": The
Lawyer as Civics Teacher in Everyday Practice,50 WM.& MARY"L. REV. 1207 (2009); Stephen L. Pepper,
Lawyers'Ethics in the Gap Between Law and Justice, 40 S.TEx. L. REv. 181 (1999); Deborah L. Rhode, Moral
Counseling, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 1317 (2006).
106. Luban has emphasized that the "element of truth" in Brandeis's speech was that lawyers are better
situated than their clients to consider the common good. Luban, Noblesse Oblige Tradition, supra note 92, at
725. And, he has more than one time suggested that lawyers should see it as their responsibility to "make their
clients better" and actively "steer their clients in the direction of the public good." Id. at 721; LuBAN, LAWYERS
AND JUSTICE, supra note 34, at 171.
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persons. The demands of "ordinary morality" are therefore inherently egalitarian;
they do not depend on social status, professional training, or expertise. Unless
one can provide an explanation of why lawyers are better situated than clients to
exercise responsible moral judgment, the chances of advancing the public good
by pursuing the client's moral choices would seem to be just as great as the
good by shaping client objectives according to
chances of advancing the public
107
choices.
moral
lawyer's
the
Finally, if one posits a morally pluralistic society in which different and
divergent reasonable conceptions of the requirements of morality exist, the idea
of lawyers policing the morality of their clients' objectives becomes especially
problematic.108 The lawyer-statesman ideal requires lawyers to assess both the
public good and their clients' deviance from the public good. Judgments about
the public good, however, depend on the application of moral standards about
which persons in a morally pluralistic society may reasonably disagree.' 0 9 If
lawyers impose limits on the pursuit of their clients' legal interests that spring
from their own understanding of morality, they abandon their public role as
channels through which clients can access the law.1" 0
The early moral theorists in legal ethics did not confront the challenges that
moral pluralism presented to their ideal of the lawyer-statesman, nor did they
endeavor to explain why lawyers are better situated than clients to take moral
responsibility for the decisions made in legal representation. By staying within
the assumptions of moral lawyers and cardboard clients, legal ethics scholars
were able to posit clients as self-interested and morally suspect and lawyers as
repositories of public values.
Because the early moral theorists critiqued an extreme and narrow vision of
partisanship, they concluded that the parameters that define lawyers' professional
duties under the standard conception-client objectives and the limits of the
law-were too weak to constrain lawyers from harming third parties and eroding
the public interest. Legal ethics scholars did not question whether legal practice
according to the standard conception served clients well; they assumed that it

107. See infra Part IH.E on whether lawyers are better situated to make moral decisions in legal
representation.
108. The problems that moral pluralism pose for legal ethical theories are a subject of increasing attention
within legal ethics. See generally Rob Atkinson, Beyond the New Role Morality for Lawyers, 51 MD. L. REv.
853 (1992); Katherine R. Kruse, Lawyers, Justice and the Challenge of Moral Pluralism,90 MriN. L. REv. 389
(2005); Thomas D. Morgan & Robert W. Tuttle, Legal Representationin a PluralistSociety, 63 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 984 (1995); Norman W. Spaulding, Reinterpreting ProfessionalIdentity, 74 U. COLO. L. REv. 1, 76-90
(2003); W. Bradley Wendel, Public Values and ProfessionalResponsibility, 75 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1 (1999).
109. For a more extended version of this argument, see Katherine R. Kruse, Lawyers, Clients and the
Challenge of Moral Pluralism,90 MINN. L. REv. 389 (2005).
110. Stephen L. Pepper, A Rejoinder to Professors Kaufman and Laban, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 657,
666; see also W. Bradley Wendel, Civil Obedience, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 363, 363 (2004).
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did."' These scholars did not consider alternative ideals of partisanship that
would encourage lawyers to be more sensitive to clients' concerns because in
their view, lawyers were already overly solicitous of clients. The ethicists focused
their attention on whether unmitigated partisanship served the public well and
whether it allowed lawyers to lead morally defensible lives. Having concluded
that it failed on both scores, the ethicists sought solutions that would bolster
lawyers' duties to the public at the expense of their loyalty to their clients.
The focus on moral lawyers and cardboard clients prevented the early ethicists
from exploring the possibility that the real problems of legal professionalism
might originate not primarily from selfish clients who push their lawyers to the
limits of the law, but primarily from lawyers who focus too narrowly on their
clients' legal interests and fail to view their clients as whole persons with a
myriad of non-legal concerns. The next Part explores how theoretical legal ethics
might have developed if moral theorists pursued the problem of legal objectification as the central moral problem of legal professionalism.
H. THE ROAD NOT TAKEN: LEGAL OBJECTIFICATION AS THE CENTRAL
PROBLEM OF LEGAL PROFESSIONALISM

A serious analysis of the problem of legal objectification is a road not taken by
legal ethics scholars. But it is a road that could have been taken. This Part traces
the potential of legal objectification as a serious object of philosophical inquiry in
legal ethics, noting that the earliest essay outlining the moral issues in legal
professionalism identified the problem of legal objectification and called for a
solution of limited deprofessionalization to decrease the professional distance
between lawyers and clients. A concurrent movement in the legal interviewing
and counseling literature advocated a client-centered approach to legal representation that reoriented the lawyer-client relationship in ways responsive to the
problem of legal objectification. Had these two threads of study come together,
they could have redefined the problems with legal professionalism and led to less
problematic solutions than appeals to the lawyer-statesman model.
A. WASSERSTROM'S LOST CONCERN FOR LEGAL OBJECTIFICATION
In 1975, Richard Wasserstrom published a groundbreaking essay that raised
"two moral criticisms of lawyers," each of which "concern[ed] the lawyer-client

111.
Postema is an exception. In his early essay, he argued that moral detachment adversely affected the
lawyer-client relationship by disengaging lawyers' abilities to relate to their clients as persons and to recognize
the clients' own moral personalities. Postema, Moral Responsibility,supranote 24, at 80. However, the solution
he proposed left the moral direction of legal representation in the hands of lawyers with no guidance as to the
meaning or goals of morally engaged partisanship. In a follow-up essay, the concern for clients was absent from
discussion and Postema focused on the effects of amoral lawyering on the personal integrity of lawyers.
Postema, Self-Image, in TH GOOD LAWYER, supra note 24.
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relationship." 1 2 The first criticism was the familiar concern that in carrying out
their professional role obligations, lawyers were required to further the interests
of morally unworthy clients and to disregard the moral harm that partisan
advocacy visits on others. 113 As discussed in Part I, this criticism of legal
profegsionalism came to dominate the discourse as legal ethics scholars framed
the moral issues in legal ethics as conflicts between role morality and ordinary
morality.
Wasserstrom's second moral criticism is less familiar: the lawyer-client
relationship is itself morally suspect because lawyers tend to objectify their
clients in legal terms and to treat them paternalistically. n 4 "[F]rom the
professional's point of view," he wrote, "the client is seen and responded to more
like an object than a human being, and more like a child than an adult."' 1 5 Legal
ethics scholars devoted limited attention to the problem of lawyer paternalism,
treating a client "more like a child than an adult."' 1 6 Legal ethics scholars,
however, have largely ignored the problem of lawyers' objectification of their
like an object than a human being," as a moral
clients, treating a client "more
17
problem in its own right.'
What is hardly ever discussed or perhaps not even noticed is that Wasserstrom
18
viewed his two moral criticisms as aspects of a single underlying pathology.
Wasserstrom noted that, paradoxically, a lawyer could be both excessively
preoccupied with a client's concerns and inattentive to the client. 1 9 He explained
of
that the lawyer accomplishes both by being "overly concerned with the interest120
person."'
whole
a
as
client
the
view
to
fail[ing]
time
the client and at the same
According to Wasserstrom, lawyers are not alone; all professionals tend to
objectify their clients or patients by focusing attention on the subject matter of
their expertise. Professionals in medicine, law, and psychology tend to view a
client or patient "not as a whole person but a segment or aspect of a person-an
interesting kidney problem, a routine marijuana possession case, or another
adolescent with an identity crisis." 12 ' For lawyers, the problem of legal
objectification arises from viewing clients narrowly in terms of their legal

112. Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals,supra note 23, at 1.
113. Id. at 3-4.
114. Id. at 1.
115. Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
116. See generally Luban, Paternalism, supra note 24; William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client
Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case, 50 MD.L. REV.213 (1991). But see David Luban, Introduction, in THE ETHICS OF

LAWYERS xi,xiv (1994) (noting that the issue of lawyers' paternalism toward clients has "attracted a much
smaller philosophical literature" than the issue of harm caused by overzealous advocacy).
117. For limited exceptions in early legal ethical literature, see Warren Lehman, The Pursuitof a Client's
Interests, 77 MIcH. L. REv. 1078 (1979); Simon, Ideology ofAdvocacy, supra note 24.
118. Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals,supra note 23, at 1, 15.
119. Id. at 16.
120. Id. (emphasis added).
121. Id. at 21.
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interests alone.
The tendency of lawyers as professionals to objectify their clients reveals the
two kinds of moral disregard for clients as whole persons and for anyone not a
client as different aspects of the same problem. The root of the problem lies in the
narrow definition lawyers give to their client's objectives. Clients arguably come
to lawyers with the capacity and desire to be moral. Lawyers, with the analytical
precision of their professional training, slough off clients' non-legal concerns and
focus only on the legally relevant aspects of the case. Consonant with their
professional training, lawyers "issue-spot" their clients as they would the facts in
a law school exam, reducing client objectives to bundles of legal rights and
interests. Lawyers then pursue those legal interests in disregard of both their
clients' actual wishes and the harm caused to others. In the process, lawyers
disregard their clients' inclinations to be cooperative, moral, and socially
responsible and encourage the self-seeking behavior that accompanies legal
interest maximization.
The solution Wasserstrom proposed to this underlying pathology of -legal
professionalism was a kind of limited "deprofessionalization" of the lawyerclient relationship. He did not go very far in elaborating what deprofessionalization might mean and he acknowledged that an adequate solution was difficult to
envision because there were certain "important and distinctive competencies"
that clients seek and lawyers possess. At the very end of his essay, Wasserstrom
suggested that the key to solving the puzzle of limited deprofessionalization
would have to "await an explicit effort to alter the ways in which lawyers are
educated and acculturated to view themselves, their clients, and the relationships
122
that ought to exist between them."
B. REDEFINING THE PROBLEM: THE HIDDEN COMPLICITY OF LAWYERS
IN SHAPING CLIENT OBJECTIVES
In the view of early legal ethics scholars, lawyers' partisan loyalty and moral
neutrality was the source of the moral and ethical problems that plagued legal
professionalism. These ethicists defined the central problems of professionalism
as stemming from lawyers' unquestioning deference to clients. Clients were the
ones who pushed their lawyers to the limits of the law while the lawyers were
required by professional duty to transgress the dictates of ordinary morality.
If, however, legal objectification is the central pathology of the legal
profession, then pinning the problems on the standard conception's combination
of partisan loyalty and moral neutrality is a misdiagnosis. If lawyers are
responsible for transforming their clients from whole persons into bundles of
legal interests, then lawyers are complicit in creating the conflicts between
personal morality and professional role morality that the early ethicists observed.
122. Id. at 23.
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Lawyers are complicit because they are responsible for defining the clients'
objectives narrowly through legal interest maximization in the first place.
The idea that lawyers shape their clients' objectives based on a particular and
professionalized perspective is supported by empirical research of the legal
profession across a number of legal practice fields.12 3 In one recent study, for
example, lawyers and clients in medical malpractice cases were surveyed to
determine their view of plaintiffs' objectives in malpractice suits. When asked
why plaintiffs sue, lawyers on all sides of litigation, representing doctors,
hospitals and patients, "either immediately or ultimately described the issue as
one of money-solely or primarily." 124 By contrast, the vast majority of medical
malpractice plaintiffs did not cite money as their sole or even their primary
motivation and sixty-five percent of plaintiffs did not even mention money until
they were prompted.1 25 What plaintiffs said they wanted to gain by suing were
admissions of responsibility, the prevention of harm to others, answers to their
questions, retribution for misconduct, and apologies for the suffering caused by
medical error. 126 The study concluded that the discontinuity between lawyer and
client understandings of clients' objectives was due in part to the fact that
"lawyers are trained to operate according to rights and rules, applying law to facts
and placing people and occurrences into legal categories." 127 As a consequence,
lawyers endeavored to fit their clients' more emotional goals "into legally
128
cognizable categories-ultimately relating to monetary compensation alone."
The problem of legal objectification was discussed in a pair of other early legal
ethics articles. In 1978, as one part of a sweeping critique of professional
ideology, William Simon argued that lawyers who adhere to the dominant
ideology of professionalism "impute certain basic aims to the client and ...
work to advance these imputed ends. '129 As Simon noted, the ends are defined on
the basis of egoistic assumptions that "emphasize extreme selfishness."1 3 0 Simon
suggested that lawyers end up representing a "hypothetical person with only a
few crude discrete ends" who bears little resemblance to the real client whose
satisfaction relies on a complex balance of interrelated goals within the context of
cooperative social relationships. 1 3 1 In an essay published a year later, Warren

123. See generally AusTiN SAAT & WII..AM L. F. FELsTNER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR CLIENTS:
PowER AND MEANING IN THE LEGAL PROCESS (1995) (divorce); Tamara Relis, "It's Not About the Money!": A
Theory on Misconceptions of Plaintiffs'LitigationAims, 68 U. Prrr. L. REv. 701 (2007) (medical malpractice);
Marvin W. Mindes & Alan C. Adcock, Trickster Hero, Helper: A Report on the Lawyer Image, 1982 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 177 (survey of lawyers and public on the image of lawyers).
124. Relis, supra note 123, at 713.
125. Id. at721.
126. Id. at 723.

127. Id. at 740.
128. Id. at 741.
129. Simon, Ideology ofAdvocacy, supranote 24, at 53.

130. Id. at 54.
131. Id. at55.
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Lehman further developed Simon's point by analyzing how the lawyer's
instrumentalist approach to legal advice based on the interests of a "standardized" client can distort the decision-making of clients, whose deference to their
lawyers' expertise may cause
them to overvalue factors like the tax consequences
132
of important life decisions.
Lawyers' complicity in shaping their clients' objectives was also revealed,
though not explicitly discussed, in Luban's discussion of custody blackmail in
divorce cases. Luban offered custody blackmail as an example of "precisely the
sort of hardball tactic that would be virtually impossible to justify without the
standard conception." 1 33 He described it as a practice in which "the divorcing
father (at the behest of his attorney) threatens to demand joint custody unless the
mother reduces her financial demands." 134 It is beyond the bounds of morality, he
argued, for "the zealous divorce lawyer [to] suggest[] custody blackmail to a
father who has no desire for custody."' 135 Such a lawyer "has wronged the wife
and children, contributed to the social problem of emiserated divorced mothers,
13 6
added to the general sexism of American society and abused the legal system."'
For Luban, custody blackmail exemplified the need for lawyers to break role
and take moral charge of the legal representation by refusing to pursue a financial
benefit for their clients at the cost of moral harm to others; however, custody
blackmail is also precisely the sort of hardball tactic that it is difficult to imagine a
divorcing father coming up with on his own. Luban's own description of the
practice reveals the active participation of the divorce lawyer. The divorcing
father makes the custody demand "at the behest of his attorney" who "suggests"
it to him. The very definition of the tactic implies that the lawyer advances a
claim for custody that the client doesn't really want to win. Lawyers are the ones
who begin legal representation by constructing their clients narrowly in the
image of the clients' legal interests; thus, lawyers are the ones likely to come up
with the tactic of custody blackmail in the first place.' 3 7

132. Lehman, supra note 24, at 1088-89. Lehman relates two personal anecdotes in support of his point
about tax consequences. In one, a client defers an intended gift until a more tax advantageous time and ends up
dying in a car crash without ever bestowing the gift. Id. at 1088. In the other, a widow recovering from
alcoholism avoids going to a lawyer for advice on selling a house that has become an emotional and
psychological burden to live in, fearful that she will be talked into delaying the sale to gain a tax advantage. Id.
at 1089.
133. Luban, Partisanship,Betrayal andAutonomy, supra note 104, at 1016.
134. Id. at 1015.
135. Id. at 1018.
136. Id.
137. Because the practice of custody blackmail is an ethically marginal tactic, a lawyer who was morally
disinclined to employ it could easily find support in professional standards of conduct. See MODEL RuLEs R.
4.4(a) ("In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to
embarrass, delay, or burden a third person.").
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C. RE-DEFINING THE SOLUTION: THE CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH TO
LEGAL REPRESENTATION

At about the same time Wasserstrom called for "an explicit effort to alter the
ways in which lawyers are educated and acculturated to view themselves, their
clients, and the relationships that ought to exist between them,"' 138 legal
education was in the nascent stages of a movement with just those goals. Also
undergoing fluorescence in the mid- 1970s, the clinical legal education movement
was in the midst of developing a curriculum for teaching the skills and values of
lawyering in the context of live client representation. 139 However well cardboard
clients worked to discuss dilemmas in the legal ethics classroom, they were
ill-fitted to the clinical teaching context, in which law students developed
relationships with actual clients and confronted the complexities of their clients'
life situations in their fullest dimensions.
Scholars writing the client interviewing and counseling literature designed for
clinical teaching developed a solution to the problem of legal objectification. The
most prominent model of lawyering to emerge from the clinical legal education
movement was the development of client-centered representation, an approach
that encouraged lawyers to conceptualize legal representation as problemsolving, to attend to clients' non-legal needs, and to include them in participatory
decision-making on matters of legal strategy.140 Client-centered representation is
taught pervasively in law school clinical and lawyering skills courses and has
since generated a rich body of practice and pedagogy-based scholarship about
lawyering, much of which explores the internal dynamics of the lawyer-client
relationship. 141
The client-centered approach is directly responsive to the problem of legal
objectification. It urges lawyers to unlearn the professional habit of "issuespotting" their clients and to approach their clients as whole persons who are
more than the sum of their legal interests. The hallmarks of the client-centered
approach include understanding the client's problem from the client's point of

138. Wasserstrom, Roles and Morality, in THE Gooo LAWYER, supranote 24, at 23.
139. The earliest clinical teaching materials focused on the acquisition of professional role by breaking down
and analyzing the various aspects of legal representation that made up what Gary Bellow and Bea Moulton
famously called "the lawyering process." GARY BELLOW & BEA MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS:
MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL INSTRUCrION INADVOCACY (1978). For a history of this pedagogical movement, see
Symposium: Celebrating The Lawyering Process, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 1 (2003).

140. DAVID A. BINDER, ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIEN-CENTERED APPROACH 2-15 (1991). For a
comprehensive examination of the history and theoretical basis for this approach, see Robert D. Dinerstein,
Client-CenteredCounseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REv. 501 (1990). For a survey of the
growth and development of the client-centered approach into a multiplicity of closely-related lawyering
theories, see Katherine R. Kruse, Fortressin the Sand: The Plural Values of Client-CenteredRepresentation, 12

CLINICAL L. REv. 369 (2006).
141. For a fuller description of the theories that have grown up in the critique, expansion and modification of
the client-centered approach, see Kruse, Fortress in the Sand, supra note 140, at 375-99.
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view and shaping legal advice around the client's values. 142 Under the
client-centered approach, hearing clients' stories and understanding their values,
cares, and commitments is the first step and a continuing duty of legal
representation. 143
The client-centered approach also reorients the lawyer-client relationship
along the lines of limited de-professionalization foreshadowed by Wasserstrom's
essay. In a highly professionalized conception of role, lawyers exercise maximum professional control over strategic decisions with minimal consultation
from clients.' 44 In client-centered representation, the focus on understanding
clients' objectives more broadly and holistically tends to break down the
boundaries between legal and non-legal strategies for addressing clients'
problems. 145 By contrast, the lawyer-statesman ideal proposed by legal ethics
scholars reinforces a highly professionalized view of the lawyer-client relationship. In addition to using professional expertise to shape tactical and strategic
decisions, lawyers are encouraged to make professional judgments about
morality and the public good. Some versions of the lawyer-statesman model view
client influence and participation in representation decisions as a threat to the
independence that lawyers need to establish and maintain to play an effective role
as mediator between clients' self-interested objectives and the public interest."'
Yet, the conceptualization of client-centered representation developed in
clinical legal education has been slow to catch on in legal ethics. As some have
noted, although the client-centered approach is appropriate in the context of
representing the poor .and otherwise marginalized clients typically served in law
school clinics, it may have limited application in the circles of highly-paid
lawyers for high-powered clients. 147 Moreover, as legal ethics has matured as an

142. BINDER Er AL., supra note 140, at 19-22. The client-centered approach is contrasted with more
traditional approaches to lawyering, which "view client problems primarily in terms of existing doctrinal
categories" and "seek the best 'legal' solutions to problems without fully exploring how those solutions meet
clients' nonlegal as well as legal concerns." Id. at 17.
143. For discussion of techniques for helping lawyers hear and understand their clients' stories and
perspectives, see Jane Harris Aiken, Striving to Teach "Justice, Fairnessand Morality," 4 CLINICAL L. REv. 1
(1997); Jane H. Aiken, Provocateursfor Justice, 7 CLINICAL L. REv. 287 (2001); Susan Bryant, The Five Habits:
Building Cross-Cultural Competence in Lawyers, 8 CLINICAL L. REv. 65 (2001); Kimberly O'Leary, Using
"DifferenceAnalysis" to Teach Problem-Solving, 4 CLINICAL L. REv. 65 (1997).
144. DOUGLAS E. RosENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? 7-28 (1974) (contrasting traditional

and client-participatory professional relationships).
145. Kruse, Fortressin the Sand, supra note 140, at 392-94.
146. Gordon, supranote 93, at 18.
147. See Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REv. 717, 718-19 (1987) (distinguishing
contexts in which clients "enjoy economic leverage over their lawyers" from those in which lawyers' social
status and expertise gives them power over clients); see also Dinerstein, supra note 140, at 521-23 (discussing
whether "the historical relationship to poverty law means [s]
that client-centered counseling should be restricted
to representation of poor people"); Kimberly E. O'Leary, When Context Matters: How to Choose an
Appropriate Client Counseling Model, 4 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLNICAL L. 103 (2001) (distinguishing

practice settings in which client-centered practice is more or less appropriate).
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academic discipline, legal ethics scholars have increasingly gravitated toward
analyzing the scandals and pressures of practice in the big law firm, where the
vision of "zeal at the margin" is "alive and well" and the conflicts between role
morality and ordinary morality can most clearly be found. 148 Unfortunately, as
the paths of clinical scholarship and legal ethics have diverged, Wasserstrom's
early insight that connected lawyers' amoral attitude toward third parties outside
the lawyer-client relationship to lawyers' amoral disregard for their clients as
persons has been lost.

III. LEGAL ETHIcS FOR THREE-DIMENSIONAL CLIENTS
This Part weaves the insights of client-centered representation into legal ethics
by proposing and defending a theoretical model of client value-based representation that redefines the standard conception's principles of partisanship and
neutrality in the context of three-dimensional clients who come to legal
representation with a mixture of values, commitments, relationships, hopes,
dreams, and fears. This new conception starts from the premise that client
objectives are complex and multidimensional and places client values, as the
client defines them, at the center of a lawyer's partisan duties. When the pursuit
of a client's objectives is redefined in the context of three-dimensional clients, the
standard conception's principles of partisan loyalty and moral neutrality look
different. This Part argues that the redefined versions of partisan loyalty and
moral neutrality survive the critiques that legal ethics scholars leveled at the
extreme version of partisanship captured by "zeal at the margin" without
succumbing to the dangers of moral elitism and moral overreaching that the
lawyer-statesman model presents.
A. PUTTING CLIENT VALUES AT THE CENTER OF LEGAL
REPRESENTATION

In an early article on lawyer paternalism,1 4 9 David Luban provided a
theoretical vocabulary of wants, values, and interests with untapped potential for
addressing Wasserstrom's puzzle of limited deprofessionalization. Wasserstrom
noted that the idea of limited deprofessionalization is difficult to implement
because clients come to lawyers for help with problems that really do require
legal expertise. Although reducing a client to nothing more than a bundle of legal
interests is problematic, legal issue-spotting is a core competency of lawyering

148. Douglas N. Frenkel, et al., Introduction: Bringing Legal Realism to the Study of Ethics and
Professionalism, 67 FORDHAm L. REv. 697, 703 (1998) (summarizing the conclusion of an empirical study of
large-firm litigators' ethical attitudes that the standard conception was "alive and well"); see also Luban,
Partisanship,Betrayal and Autonomy, supra note 104, at 1016 ("The true haven of the standard conception,
however, is large-firm practice.").
149. Luban, Paternalism,supra note 24.
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and a necessary component of virtually all legal representation. ts° The puzzle is
in figuring out how to "weaken the bad consequences" of lawyers' tendency to
the lawyer-client relationship "without destroying the good that
professionalize
151
do."
lawyers
Luban's theoretical vocabulary redefines client objectives in three dimensions,
suggesting that client objectives are complex, ambiguous, and potentially
conflicting. Luban theoretically distinguished three different aspects of a client's
objectives, as follows:
desires in the moment; they are
" Wants are those things a client subjectively
1 52
like facts that exist but cannot be disputed.
an
" Values are the desires with which a client most closely identifies, playing 153
important role in defining a client's larger life-plans and self-conceptions.
" Interests are "generalizable means to any ultimate end"; 154 they include
55
freedom, wealth, health, power, and control over other people's actions. 1
but as means by which we can
Interests are not valuable in themselves, 56
satisfy our wants and actualize our values.'
According to Luban's analysis, the touchstone for a lawyer's appropriate
intervention into client decision-making is whether the intervention supports or
undermines the client in actualizing her values.1 57 The primacy of client values
emerges from the way Luban analyzes what a lawyer should do when clients'
wants, interests, and values conflict. Luban argued that lawyers are justified in
paternalistically manipulating clients to promote the clients' interests in favor of
the clients' wants.15 8 If a client expresses the desire to deviate from the
maximization of legal interests, Luban saw it as "the lawyer's job to voice the
conservative and restrained point of view" from the standpoint of the client's
interests.159 Because wants come and go, a lawyer who protects a client's
interests can serve as a sort of "ego" to the client's "id," getting clients past the
fleeting wants that dominate their desires in the moment and keeping their future

150. MODEL RuLES R. 1.1, cmt. 2.
151. Wasgerstrom, Roles and Morality, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supranote 24, at 23.
152. Luban, Paternalism,supra note 24, at 468.
153. Id. at 470.
154. Id. at471.
155. Id. at 466, 471.
156. Id. at 474.
157. I have previously discussed respect for client values in terms of enhancing a client's autonomy. Kruse,
Fortressin the Sand, supra note 140, at 399-414. When a lawyer overrides a client's wants in favor the client's
interests, Luban calls it "justifiable paternalism." Luban, Paternalism, supra note 24, at 473. But see Simon,
Mrs. Jones' Case, supra note 116, at 224 (arguing that refined versions of autonomy and paternalism converge
in a view that would support a client in actualizing her own values).
158. Luban, Paternalism,supranote 24, at 472-74.
159. Id. at493.

2010]

BEYOND CARDBOARD CLIENTS

options open.'6o Lawyers'are not justified, however, in paternalistically manipulating clients to further the clients' interests in ways that override the clients'
values. 161 Because values form the core of a client's personality, manipulating a
client to act against the client's values is a violation of the client's personal
integrity. 162 Such paternalistic intervention cannot be justified because interests
are not valuable in 163
themselves; they derive their value from their utility as means
toward other ends.
When lawyers place the actualization of client values at the center of legal
representation, lawyers see their job as assisting their clients in making decisions
that are consistent with clients' most important goals and life plans. As Luban and
other philosophers have discussed, values are the beliefs closest to the centers of
our personalities, and which invest our lives with meaning. 1" Values play a dual
role in our lives, both motivating our actions and shaping the way we define
ourselves. Our values are in one sense normative, providing reasons for our
actions; 165 but values also are expressions of our identity, defining who we are.
Furthermore, values connect our motivation to act with how we define ourselves;
by acting in accordance with our values, we become the persons we want to be. 166
The process of assessing and clarifying our values in situations of value
conflict may be difficult. Our deepest values are often opaque; we may be
motivated by underlying values that we do not explicitly recognize, but that
viewed over time tie our choices together in recognizable patterns. 167 Moreover,
our process of value clarification may be distorted by short-term and reactionary
emotions like anger, fear, and insecurity.1 68 Alternately, we may succumb to
rationalizations that sound like the articulation of our values, but which really are
excuses for doing what we want to do in the moment. Value clarification is a
process of self-reflection often triggered by experiences of confrontation and
choice that helps penetrate the fog of confusion that may attend practical choices
in the face of uncertainty. Value clarification serves to help us discover and order
160. Id. at 493; see also id. at 486 (arguing that the superiority of what he calls the Ideal of Prudence "lies in
the flexibility of the goods I have termed 'interests' in realizing our ambitions, not in the intrinsic merits of
money or power.., in other words, in its breadth and not in its depth").
161. Luban, Paternalism,supra note 24, at 472-74.
162. Id. at 473.
163. Id. at 474 ("[Ijt is absurd... to assume that interests constitute the dominant values in a human life.").
164. Id. at 470; Bernard Williams, Persons, Characterand Morality, in MORAL LUCK, supra note 27, at 1,
12-13 (describing "ground projects" through which we define our lives' success).
165. CmusT'E KORSGAARD, THE SouRcEs OF NoRMATrVrrv 8 (1996) (normative statements "make claims on
us; they command, oblige, recommend or guide").
166. For a discussion of this idea in the context of autonomy theory, see Kruse, Fortress in the Sand, supra
note 140, at 404-05.
167. Luban, Paternalism,supra note 24, at 470. In later work, Luban has suggested that many times we do
not experience the things we care the most about as being chosen by us, but rather we feel as if our values have
chosen us. DAvID LuBAN, Lawyers As Upholders of Human Dignity (When They Aren't Busy Assaulting It), in
LEGAL ETICs AND HUMAN DON=TY, supra note 43, at 65, 76.

168. Luban, Paternalism,supra note 24, at 473.
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our values so that our lives
reflect our values, and we can become the kind of
69
persons we want to be.'
When clients come to lawyers for legal advice and representation, their legal
issues are often entangled with values, projects, commitments, and relationships
with others. Sometimes legal tasks may touch on a client's deeply held personal
values, such as getting legal help to start up a business a client has always
dreamed of having or helping a couple adopt a child. Sometimes legal action
arises because a client was harmed by the actions of others: the client was fired•
from a job, hit by a car, or beaten by a spouse. Sometimes the client is accused of
treating others unjustly: the client sexually harassed an employee, reneged on a
deal, negligently allowed harm to others, or committed a crime. Other times
clients come to lawyers to overcome barriers to doing day-to-day business: the
client needs to negotiate a deal, to lease property, or to obtain a permit.
In discussions with clients, lawyers inevitably emphasize and order information in ways that influence clients' choices.' 70 Whether or not a lawyer discusses
a client's other commitments, projects, relationships, or values, the client still
experiences the legal interests within the context of these other considerations.
The counseling approach the lawyer employs will alter the client's perspective in
favor of particular considerations. If the lawyer believes that her role is to
maximize the client's legal interests, the lawyer will take an approach that
emphasizes legal interests over other considerations. In contrast, lawyers who
believe that their role is to shape the representation around a client's values will
give their clients space to clarify those values and make representation decisions
that are consistent with those values.
As Luban pointed out, lawyers' tendency to focus on their clients' legal
interests may be justified to the extent that it diverts clients from making
impulsive decisions. If a client is experiencing loss, transition, or uncertainty
about the future, such as in a divorce or in the aftermath of a serious life-changing
injury, the protection of legal interests may be the most effective way to keep the
client's future options open until she is able to adjust to dramatic changes in her
life and prioritize her values. Where the threatened loss will severely impair the
client's ability to pursue options in the future-as in criminal cases where
defendants face substantial loss of liberty or even death-particularly strong
imperatives exist to protect the client's legal interests in order to maintain
avenues for the client's future ability to actualize her values.
Legal interest-based counseling, however, serves the actualization of the
client's life goals only indirectly. Legal interests are not good in themselves; they

169. Christina Korsgaard sees the process of "reflective endorsement" as central to our ability to act
autonomously--to give authoritative law to ourselves. See KORSGAARD, supranote 165, at 129.
170. See Simon, Mrs. Jones's Case, supra note 116, at 217-18 (describing how lawyers influence their
clients' decision-making even when they are ostensibly providing clients with information about legal
interests).
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are merely the channels by which clients can use the law to pursue and protect
what they value in life. Protecting a client's legal interests helps the client only
because interests are generalized means toward anyone's ends. The temporary
restraint on impulsive decision-making that legal interests provide is valuable
precisely because pursuing the wants of the moment may foreclose the client
from actualizing more deeply-held values, goals, or life plans.
Counseling that proceeds on the assumption that clients merely want to
maximize their legal interests is far from neutral. In the context of legal
representation, where the client may be confronting new opportunities or battling
fear, uncertainty, anger, or pain, counseling clients that they "should" do what is
in their legal interests to do may distort the client's process of value clarification
and encourage self-seeking choices. 171 Lawyers who say "this is what you should
do" when what they really mean is "this is what it is in your legal interests to do,"
may encourage clients to press their legal interests further than the clients might
otherwise be inclined. Clients who might otherwise be motivated to act in the
public interest may be dissuaded by their deference to a lawyer's professional
expertise. Furthermore, if a client is experiencing hurt or anger, knowing how the
law can be used to defeat the interests of others may provide the client with a way
to rationalize selfish choices at the expense of the client's better moral judgment.
job," clients may
Just as lawyers may seek refuge in the excuse, "that is not my
' 172
seek refuge in the excuse, "I am just following legal advice."
When a lawyer approaches legal representation as a problem-solving endeavor
shaped around the client's values, the client's own values provide a natural check
on legal interest maximization. Like legal interests, appeals to client values help
curb impulsive, fearful, or vengeful decisions. Rather than achieving this goal by
appealing to a hypothetical client's standardized interests, however, client value
clarification appeals directly to the individual client's own values. The purpose of
value clarification in legal counseling is not to change the weight or priority of the
client's values, though that might be a byproduct of the process. Rather, the
purpose is to ensure that the client's representation decisions are consistent with
and further the client's values.
The methods of client value clarification involve both actively listening to
what the client wants and probing beneath the client's expressed desires.
Client-centered interviewing literature, for example, suggests that the lawyer
dedicate time early in a client's initial interview for open-ended questions and
other active listening techniques that help the lawyer hear the client's problem in
the client's own terms. 173 Hearing the client's story as the client chooses to tell it
is a key component of understanding what the client values and what it is about
the legal representation that will threaten or further those values.
171. Lehman, supranote 24, at 1088-89.
172. See Pepper, Lawyers'Ethics, supranote 105, at 189-90.
173. BINDER Er AL., supra note 140, at 88-93.
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Client value clarification also may require probing beneath the surface of a
client's stated desires. As Warren Lehman suggested, when clients seek legal
representation, their judgment and articulation of what they really want may be
skewed. "We say we want justice when we want love. We say we were treated
illegally when we were hurt. We insist upon our rights when we have been
snubbed or cut. We want money when we feel impotent." 174 Lehman noted that
instead of inquiring about clients' deeper goals, most lawyers give instrumentalist
advice on how to maximize outcomes based on the desires of a hypothetical
"'standard client' for whom lawyers are wont to model their services."' 175 In
contrast, lawyers interested in helping a client center decisions on the client's
own values will help their clients contemplate how the decisions of the moment
will affect the clients' development in the direction of becoming the kind of
person each of them uniquely wants to be.
B. PARTISAN LOYALTY FOR THREE-DIMENSIONAL CLIENTS
The centering of legal representation on client values suggests a more
defensible ideal of partisanship than the "zeal at the margin" for cardboard clients
that has occupied legal ethical critique. As discussed above, the moral theorists'
critiques of the standard conception drew their force from their extreme
interpretation of partisan loyalty as "zeal at the margin" for clients who want
nothing other than to maximize their legal interests up to and beyond the moral
limits in the law. When this conception of partisanship is replaced with an ideal
based on helping clients actualize their own values, the critiques lose much of
their force.
Hidden within the adversary system critique is a defense of partisanship
conceived more broadly as shaping legal representation around a client's actual
values and fashioning advocacy around the stories that clients would tell about
themselves. For example, Luban's argument against the truth-finding efficacy of
adversarial proceedings was based on the observation that lawyers use a client's
legal interests as a starting point from which to develop facts and present
evidence to a decision-maker. The "theories of the case" that arise from this
method are misleading because they are based, not on the client's actual
perspective of what occurred, but on what it would be best to prove from the
standpoint of the client's legal interests. 176 Under client-value centered partisanship, advocacy would be focused on finding ways to connect clients' own stories

174. Lehman, supra note 24, at 1081.
175. Id. at 1089.
176. For a criticism of advocacy that proceeds from this perspective in disregard of a client's actual story, see
Birmy Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in Case Theory, 93 MC. L. REv. 485
(1994).
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to themes and values reflected in the law.17 "7 Luban conceded that developing
facts from the actual perspectives of disputing clients, rather than from the
standpoint of their competing interests, would support, not hinder, accurate
truth-finding. 178 Luban makes the same concession in his arguments that the
adversary system cannot be defended on the grounds that it is the best way to
protect legal rights or honor human dignity. He argued that appeals to legal rights
and human dignity were insufficient to justify the "no-holds-barred" tactics that
lawyers use to gain whatever advantage a lawyer can for a client. 179 He conceded
that the adversary system could be defended quite strongly, however,1 80 when it
gives a client the opportunity to tell her own story, precisely because the
opportunity to be heard is an important way of honoring a client's dignity.
In his later work, Luban described in more detail an ideal of partisan advocacy
based on upholding a client's dignity, in which lawyers strive to match the case
theory the lawyer presents-the legal story the lawyer tells about a client in
negotiation or litigation-with the cares, commitments, and concerns that are
most central to the client. 81 According to Luban, human dignity means "having a
story of one's own," having a subjective view of the world in which one is at the
center.1 82 Lawyers dignify their clients by giving voice to their clients, by "telling
the client's story and interpreting the law from the client's viewpoint,' 183 and "by
giving the client voice and sparing the client the humiliation of being silenced
and ignored."' 184 A lawyer calibrating legal representation to a client's values
would be much less likely to cynically manipulate the facts or stretch the law to
extract anything it could be made to give, and much more likely to look for ways
to legitimate the client's values by connecting them to values reflected in the law.
Client value-centered partisanship also would survive the role disposition
theorists' critique. This critique, as discussed above, is that the standard
conception encourages lawyers to develop a professional disposition toward
amorality, which dulls them to the harm they cause others and is ultimately
unsatisfying to lawyers themselves. Client value-centered partisanship would

177. See, e.g., id; Robert D. Dinerstein, A Meditation on the Theoretics of Practice,43 HASTINGS L.J. 971
(1992); Lucie E. White, Subordination,RhetoricalSurvival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearingof
Mrs. G., 38 BuFF. L. Rev. 1 (1990).
178. See LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 34, at 73 ("The more perspectives we have, the better
informed our judgment will be.").
179. Id. at 75.
180. Id. at 85-87.
181. LuBAN, Human Dignity, supra note 43, at 68-73 (endorsing an even stronger argument in favor of
partisan advocacy based on the honoring the story that the client has to tell). Luban finds particularly persuasive
the account of adversary ethics offered by philosopher Alan Donagan as part of the Working Group on Legal
Ethics. Id. at 819. See Alan Donagan, Justifying Legal Practicein the Adversary System, in THE GOOD LAWYER,
supra note 24, at 123.
182. LuBAN, Human Dignity, supra note 43, at 70-71.
183. Id. at 70.
184. Id. at 72.
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encourage the development of a very different disposition: a disposition based in
the capacities for empathy and self-reflection.1 85 To seriously undertake the task
of centering representation on client values, lawyers would endeavor to see the
world as their clients see it, Unlike the disposition of amoral detachment, which
is argued to be at the root of lawyer alienation and discontent, 1 86 empathy with
clients is noted as a source
of internal motivation that can help sustain lawyers in
187
their professional roles.
In short, in the very places where "zeal at the margin" fails to stand up to the
deeper scrutiny of the early legal ethics scholars' critiques, client value-centered
partisanship survives. The critiques of the moral theorists are quite forceful when
leveled against the extreme vision of partisanship captured by "zeal at the
margin." Yet, if ideal partisanship is conceived as being centered on client value
actualization, a more defensible, even honorable, version of partisan loyalty
emerges.
C. MORAL NEUTRALITY FOR THREE-DIMENSIONAL CLIENTS
In addition to critiquing partisan loyalty, the early legal ethics scholars also
criticized the moral neutrality of the lawyer-client relationship. The critiques of
moral neutrality, however, like the critiques of partisan loyalty, were distorted by
the assumption of morally corrupt cardboard clients who cared only about
maximizing their wealth, freedom, or power over others. Because the early legal
ethics scholars developed their ideal in a context defined by assumptions of moral
lawyers and cardboard clients, they only considered clients who were by
definition devoid of moral constraint. Additionally, the lawyers on which the
ethicists focused were by definition more suited to moral decision-making than
the cardboard clients the ethicists constructed. Focusing on client value
actualization requires a type of moral neutrality on the part of the lawyer; because
the lawyer focuses on the client's values, the lawyer must put her own values to
the side. Although, the moral neutrality of client value-centered representation is
not morally empty. Rather, it imports moral considerations into legal representation by drawing on the rich landscape of the client's values-including the
client's moral values-that might otherwise be excised by the lawyer's focus on
legal interests.
Not all outcomes of value clarification favor morality. Whether moral claims
win out in the process of value clarification depends on how important moral

185. Markovits, supranote 68, at 273. The development of empathic understanding has long been a central
component of the client-centered approach to interviewing and counseling. See BINDER ET AL., supra note. 140,
at 40-42. Self-reflection also has been noted as a key component to successful communication between lawyers
and clients. Bryant, supranote 143, at 49.
186. See generally Postema, Self-Image, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 24.
187. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications:Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders,
106 HARv. L. REv. 1239 (1993).
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values are to the person doing the clarifying. The process of value clarification
will assist moral decision-making for persons who have internalized the moral
values about the way they ought to treat others. The process also may assist
persons who draw support for moral behavior from personal values, such as
being an upstanding citizen or a good neighbor, in standing by their commitments, honoring their word, or maintaining their reputation in a community.
Helping to clarify the values of a person with largely selfish values, however, is
likely to assist that person in endorsing his own self-regarding behavior. The
emotional core of Luban's moral activism is that standing by neutrally and
allowing such a client to act on his selfish choices would be tantamount to
condoning his mistreatment of others. Intervening to override the selfish choices
of such a client might violate his autonomy and dignity, but it may at the same
time be the only way to protect the autonomy and dignity of those who stand in
harm's way.
The moral activist approach is defensible in the narrow circumstances toward
which it was originally directed: the situation of a moral lawyer counseling a
cardboard client. The moral activist solution, however, is ill-suited to the
representation of three-dimensional clients because the tactics of moral activism
run directly contrary to the principles of respect for a client's values. The moral
activist lawyer's focus is on conforming the client's behavior to the lawyer's
conception of the public good. To achieve this end, moral activist lawyers employ
increasingly aggressive tactics of persuasion, coercion, and even betrayal, which
deliberately distort the client's decision-making process. 188 The further along the
scale the lawyer goes, the more likely the lawyer is to be battling the client's
deeply-held values. Less deeply-grounded resistance is likely to give way earlier
in the process.
When lawyers and clients disagree about the morality of a course of action, the
problems with moral activist counseling take on an added dimension. Like most
people confronted with someone reluctant to act in accordance with what we see
as the claims of morality, lawyers will have a tendency to believe that their clients
are mistaken in their moral calculus. We can affirm on an intellectual level that
our moral beliefs may reasonably differ from the moral beliefs of others. When
we are confronted with someone who does not share our moral values, however,
we struggle to understand their view as reasonable. We are more likely to believe

188. As Luban describes it,
moral activist client counseling may mean kindling the clients' consciences, but more often it will
mean inventing alternative ways for clients to satisfy their interests. Sometimes it means persuading
clients that the course of action they propose will harm them even when that is not necessarily so. In
other instances, client counseling will require threatening to withdraw from a representation or
refusing to follow a client's instructions. In the extreme cases, it means.telling the client that if he does
not back away from a course of action, the lawyer will blow the whistle on him.
Luban, Noblesse Oblige Tradition, supranote 92, at 737-38.
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that we are right and that the other person has made a "moral mistake." 18' 9 The
belief that their clients are making a moral mistake will naturally tempt lawyers
to intervene in their clients' decision-making, perhaps even by strong tactics, to
prevent what the lawyers view as a moral wrong. The stakes for the lawyer of
gaining a client's compliance with the claims of morality, as the lawyer sees
them, are especially high. Lawyers do not simply sit by and tolerate their clients'
differing moral viewpoints; they act on them. The force of the role disposition
theorists' critique of the standard conception is that being forced to act against
their own values is damaging to lawyers.
The kind of moral neutrality that results from respect for another person's
values helps to discipline lawyers' tendency to impose their own moral and value
choices on their clients in the guise of legal advice. If lawyers treat their clients as
three-dimensional persons, lawyers' respect for the clients' values can help
ensure the good that moral activism hopes to achieve by importing moral
considerations into legal representation without succumbing to the danger of
moral overreaching.
D. BEYOND MORAL LAWYERS: THREE-DIMENSIONAL LAWYERS IN THE
ARENA OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION
In the role disposition critique discussed previously, ethicists concluded that
lawyers were forced into the deeply dissatisfying kind of practice characterized
by "zeal at the margin" by their partisan loyalty to clients who insisted that
lawyers employ extreme tactics in the pursuit of immoral ends. If, however, the
premise that lawyers construct their clients' objectives as legal interest maximization is true, it must follow that lawyers who practice "zeal at the margin" are at
least partially responsible for their own misery. The possibility that lawyers
actively shape their clients' objectives in the direction of legal interest maximization raises a puzzling question for the legal ethics scholars who raised a role
disposition critique: why would lawyers willingly create situations that provide
them with deep role dissatisfaction? Part of the answer must be that, just as
clients are not solely motivated by the maximization of their legal interests,
lawyers are not purely motivated by morality and a commitment to the public
interest. Lawyers, like clients, are morally complex, three-dimensional persons
who bring a mix of reputational interests, personal relationships, values, cares,
and commitments into the arena of legal representation; all of these factors may
affect lawyers' decision-making for better or for worse.
An examination of the moral complexity of lawyers is important for another
reason as well. Even if the moral elitist premise that underlies the lawyerstatesman model-that lawyers are morally superior to their clients-is wrong, it
may be true that lawyers are generally better situatedthan clients to make moral
189. Kruse, Moral Pluralism,supra note 109, at 402-07.
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decisions in the specific arena of legal representation. As discussed above, in the
arena of legal representation, clients' own resolution of their conflicting wants,
values, and interests may be distorted by temporary conditions of anger, fear, or
insecurity. Because they are less personally and emotionally invested in the
situations that lead to legal representation, lawyers are arguably better situated in
legal representation to bring moral considerations to bear. To conclude that
lawyers are better situated as moral decision-makers in the arena of legal
representation, however, the ways in which lawyers' own wants, interests, and
values compete with their moral and professional judgment should be considered.
First, and most obviously, the lawyer-client relationship involves a commercial
exchange of services for fees, giving rise to an interest on the part of the lawyer in
maximizing the financial return on a case. However if the lawyer gets paid-by
the billable hour, contingent on the outcome, or on a flat fee or contract-the
lawyer will have a financial interest in how the representation proceeds. Hourly
fees give the lawyer an interest in spending a lot of time on a case, especially if
the client is a "deep pocket" with virtually unlimited resources to sink into legal
representation. Consequently, a lawyer billing by the hour may have a financial
interest in making an extravagant investment of time or resources in a task that
produces only marginally better results for the client. Contingent fees give
lawyers an interest in maximizing outcomes with as little investment of time as
possible, and at any cost to others along the way. Flat fees or contracts give
lawyers an interest in resolving the representation of each client as quickly as
possible, providing an incentive to conclude or to settle the matter whether or not
the client has fully understood or bought into the terms of the settlement or
agreement.
Moreover, lawyers have a legal interest in protecting themselves from
malpractice lawsuits by advising clients to maximize legal interests and by
leaving a clear paper trail anytime a client declines to follow that advice. Lawyers
who fail to pursue a client's legal interests as far as possible risk exposure to
malpractice claims if the client suffers financial damage as a result of the
decision. Even if a client made an informed and reasonable decision not to pursue
a possible avenue of relief, the lawyer may be concerned about liability in the
event of the client's future change of heart. The commonly recommended "CYA"
letters that lawyers send to clients are designed to protect themselves against
future malpractice suits anytime a client decides to act against a lawyer's advice
0
or the client's own interests. 19
Lawyers also have reputational interests at stake in legal representation.
Lawyers may depend on their professional reputations to make their practices run
smoothly and may be subject to informal social sanctions for engaging in
behavior that does not serve the values or interests of other members of their

190. See generally Karen Erger, Cover Me: DocumentationIs More Than CYA, 98 ILL. B.J. 316 (2008).
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professional community.1 9 1 In some cases, this pressure to conform to informal

professional norms can support ethical behavior, 192 but it also can work as a
collective protectionist strategy to discriminate against lawyers who represent
outsiders or who are themselves outsiders to the legal community.'9 3
In addition, lawyers, like their clients, have personal values, cares, and
commitments that come into play in legal representation. Their personal
identities may be defined in part by their ability to win, their sense of fair play, or
even their ruthlessness or gritty determination. They may have ambitions for
career advancement, such as the desire to make partner in a firm or to get an
appointment as a judge. Preserving relationships inside and outside of professional circles may be personally important to lawyers. They may have political
commitments to practicing a certain kind of law or achieving a certain vision of
social justice through their legal careers. They may value their families and the
balance that they can achieve between work and home life. They may be
members of religious communities or political organizations with accompanying
values and commitments that interact with or affect the actions they take as
lawyers. Any or all of these personal values and ambitions may affect lawyers'
decisions in legal representation.
As other critics of the role disposition critique have noted, the premise that
lawyers are driven to overly zealous tactics by the loyal pursuit of client interests
does not paint a particularly accurate picture of legal practice. 194 When lawyer
behavior is examined more closely, a better explanation for why lawyers seem to
engage in "zeal at the margin" is because their own interests are served by doing
so, not because they are overly concerned with loyalty to their clients. Lawyers
practicing in small communities are likely to curb the zeal of their advocacy to
195
preserve their professional relationships and standing in the community.
Lawyers for relatively powerless, one-shot clients are more than willing to
manipulate their clients into taking deals that help maintain the lawyer's
professional standing.1 96
Even in the places where the ruthless tactics of "zeal at the margin" seem to be
a more accurate description of lawyers' practices, such as at large litigation firms,
the lawyer's own drive to maximize profits by amassing billable hours provides
at least as good an explanation as the premise that these lawyers are acting out of
loyalty to their clients. At least, the assumption that big firm lawyers are driven by

191. See generally Wendel, supra note 97.
192. Id. at 1968-69.
193. Id.
194. See Schneyer, Standard Misconception, supra note 24, at 1544-50; Stephen Ellmann, Lawyering for
Justice in a Flawed Democracy, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 116, 124-29 (1990).
195. Schneyer, StandardMisconception, supra note 24, at 1546-47; Donald Landon, Clients, Colleagues,
and Communities: The Shaping of Zealous Advocacy in County Law Practice, 1985 AM. B. FoUND. REs. J. 81.
196. Schneyer, Standard Misconception, supra note 24, at 1544-45 (discussing Abraham Blumberg, The
Practiceof Law as Confidence Game, 1 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 15 (1967)).
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their own financial interests may better explain how the same lawyers who
engage in scorched earth litigation tactics are also willing to gouge their own
clients with questionable billing practices. 197
In the arena of legal representation, lawyers and clients are thus differently
situated as moral decision-makers, but it is difficult to conclude that one is better
positioned than the other to keep legal representation within appropriate moral
boundaries. The situations that lead clients to seek legal representation may
incline clients to pursue their wants in favor of their values. Lawyers will
generally have no particular investment in the situations in which their clients are
embroiled. Lawyers, however, will inevitably have financial, reputational, and
personal interests that present their own form of temptation to transgress moral
and professional values. The principles of partisan loyalty and moral neutrality,
redefined as attention and deference to client value choices, can help check
lawyers' own self-interested motivations in legal representation.
E. SPA ULDING V ZIMMERMAN IN THREE DIMENSIONS

This Article began by suggesting that the traditional interpretation of
Spaulding v. Zimmerman, the legal ethics classic in Which the lawyer for a
defendant in a personal injury automobile accident case chose not to inform the
plaintiff that he suffered a life-threatening heart aneurysm, has been used by legal
ethics scholars to raise the wrong question. As traditionally interpreted,
Spaulding presents a moral and ethical dilemma for the lawyer: should the lawyer
breach the professional duty of confidentiality to save a human life?' 98 This
interpretation of Spaulding, however, is driven more by a theoretical interest in
creating conflicts between role morality and ordinary morality than by the
real-life facts of the case. This section returns to the real-life facts of Spaulding to
explore the more interesting ethical question of why the lawyer felt entitled to
settle the case without consulting John Zimmerman about whether to reveal the
potentially life-saving information.
As argued above, at the heart of the more interesting question in Spaulding is
the problem of legal objectification: the lawyer who pressed on to settlement
without consulting his client about the moral issue of revealing Spaulding's
life-threatening medical condition was thinking only in terms of his client's legal
interests. Certainly, volunteering otherwise confidential information that could
increase the amount Zimmerman owed in damages was contrary to his legal
interests. The defense expert who examined Spaulding opined that the heart

197. See generally Lisa G. Lerman, Gross Profits?: QuestionsAbout Lawyer Billing Practices,22 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 645 (1994); Lisa G. Lerman, Blue-Chip Bilking: Regulation of Billing and Expense Fraud By Lawyers,
12 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 205 (1999); Susan Saab Fortney, The Billable Hours Derby: Empirical Data on the
Problemsand PressurePoints, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 171 (2005).
198. See, e.g., LuBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 34, at 149-50.
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aneurysm possibly was caused by the automobile accident at issue in the
litigation. Furthermore, if the doctor was right, it might have affected the amount
of money for which Spaulding was willing to settle the case;1 99 however, this
narrow view of John Zimmerman's priorities overlooked his relationship with
Spaulding and other values that might have influenced Zimmerman to reveal the
medical information to save the life of his neighbor and friend.
If the lawyer had followed a client value-based approach to legal representation, a different situation would have resulted. First, the lawyer would not have
received the information about Spaulding's heart aneurysm in the vacuum of
legal interests. Because consistency with Zimmerman's long-term goals and
deeply-held values would have been a central concern in the legal representation,
the lawyer would have spent time at the beginning of the representation listening
to Zimmerman about hearing about the context in which the lawsuit. When the
information about Spaulding's heart aneurysm came across his desk, the lawyer
would have been attuned to the importance of the information, not just to the
legal case, but to Zimmerman's relationship with the Spaulding family. And, he
would have flagged it as an important issue to discuss with his client.
In discussing with Zimmerman the question of whether to reveal the
confidential information about Spaulding's medical condition, the lawyer would
explain to Zimmerman that he wasn't legally required to reveal the information
and that revealing it might drive up the costs of settlement, perhaps even over the
limits of the insurance policy. The lawyer, however, would also be prepared to
help Zimmerman put his legal interests into the context of his other values and
commitments. For example, the lawyer might probe to ensure that whatever
decision Zimmerman made about divulging the information was consistent with
Zimmerman's long-term values, perhaps asking Zimmerman how he would feel
looking back on the decision from some vantage point in the future.
From what we know about the real Spaulding case, the kind of discussion
discussed above never occurred. Furthermore, Spaulding provides a window into
the personal, financial, and reputational interests that may have prevented the
discussion from occurring. Zimmerman's lawyer was hired and paid by the
insurance company to represent Zimmerman, and the insurance contract most
likely gave the insurance company rights to control the certain aspects of the
defense. 200 Although these contractual rights complicate the decision-making
authority in the legal representation, they do not alleviate the lawyer's professional responsibility to consult with his client about important representation
decisions, to share information that might create conflicting interests, and to

199. When the heart aneurysm was eventually discovered, it required corrective surgery that resulted in
severe speech loss for David Spaulding. Cramton & Knowles, supra note 7, at 71. Before it was corrected,
David Spaulding suffered two years of intense and disabling chest pains. Floyd & Gallagher, supra note 2, at
948.
200. Id. at 90-91; see also Floyd & Gallagher, supra note 2, at 947.
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interests in the event of a conflict of interest with the
protect Zimmerman's
2 °t
insurance company.
The lawyer's own interest in future business with the insurance company
provided a powerful incentive' for him to overlook Zimmerman's actual
objectives, which might have conflicted with the interests of the insurance
company. Zimmerman was a one-shot client that the lawyer was not likely to
encounter again. The lawyer's long-term financial and reputational interests lay
in protecting his relationship with the insurance company that hired and paid
him. 202 If Zimmerman had insisted on revealing the confidential information, a
settlement within the policy limits may not have been possible, creating20 a3
financial conflict of interest between Zimmerman and the insurance company.
Even if the settlement remained within the policy limits, Zimmerman's insistence
on revealing the information might have created a conflict of interest requiring
the lawyer to withdraw. By construing Zimmerman's objectives narrowly in
terms of legal interests the lawyer could maintain a view of his client's objectives
in which his client's interests remained aligned with the interests of the insurance
company: in a narrow sense, they shared an interest in minimizing the amount of
the settlement.
Alternatively, the lawyer may have viewed the insurance company as the real
party in interest and gave little thought to John Zimmerman as a client. 20 4 Of

course, that reasoning does not answer the question of why the lawyer did not
engage in a serious value-based discussion about revealing confidential information with representatives of the insurance company. 20 5 Possibly, if consulted,
representatives of the insurance company would have directed the lawyer to
reveal the information. After all, Spaulding's life hung in the balance, and a
human life is a powerful counterweight to the profit motive of even the most
calculating profit-maximizer. 20 6 Even absent the long-term relationship with
Spaulding that might have motivated Zimmerman to reveal the information, the
201. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 134 (2000); ABA FORMAL Op. 01-421 (Feb.
16, 2001). For contrasting analyses of the difficulties of professional obligations in the insurance law context,
see Thomas D. Morgan, What InsuranceScholars Should Know About Professional Responsibility,4 CONN. INS.
L.J. 1 (1997); Kent D. Syverud, What ProfessionalResponsibility Scholars Should Know About Insurance, 4
CONN. INS. L.J. 17 (1997).

202. Cramton & Knowles, supra note 7, at 92-93.
203. Cf.ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-403 (1996).
204. Cramton & Knowles, supra note 7, at 93.
205. Id. at 93-94 (concluding that although it is possible that disclosure was discussed in the context of
settlement offers with the insurance company "it is not clear ... that the issue was the subject of pointed and
meaningful consultation" and that "[t]he most likely conclusion is that the defense lawyers made this decision
largely on their own").
206. Id. at 94-95, quoting Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the
Jurisprudenceand Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545, 1606 (1995) ("I wonder why we assume that the
middle-level manager in the defendant's insurance company.., is likely to be more concerned with company
profits (or with his own career advancement or security) than with the possible death of the plaintiff."); see also
Floyd & Gallagher, supra note 2, at 950 (noting that the trial attorneys sent a young associate to argue the case in
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lawyer might have assumed, at least presumptively, that the opportunity to save
another human life was important to his insurance company client as well.
Finally, even after consultation, Zimmerman conceivably might have directed
his lawyer not to reveal the information about Spaulding's health. Zimmerman
might have decided that he could not harm his family by disclosing the
information; the accident killed his brother and broke his father's neck, the family
was struggling to hold things together, and he just could not inflict a devastating
financial blow to his mother and surviving family members. If so, the lawyer
taking a client-value based approach might have faced something like the
dilemma discussed by early legal ethics scholars between whether to remain
loyal to the duties of confidentiality or to follow the moral imperative to save a
human life.
The lawyer's dilemma at the conclusion of a client value-based discussion,
however, would not be the same dilemma envisioned by the early legal ethics
scholars. The lawyer's dilemma would not arise out of the lawyer's solitary
struggle over whether to break out of the impersonal demands of a professional
role. Rather, the dilemma would arise in the context of overriding the decision of
a three-dimensional client who had struggled through a difficult moral choice.
Betraying another person with whom you stand in a relationship of trust and
protection is qualitatively different than betraying a role obligation. Furthermore,
this difference cannot help but affect the lens through which the lawyer views his
ordinary moral obligations. The lawyer who chooses to override his client's
considered moral decision says, in essence: "You may not be willing to bring
more hardship upon your family to save David Spaulding's life, but I am going to
do it anyway without your permission and against your wishes." When the early
legal ethics scholars talked about breaking out of bureaucratic professional roles
to acknowledge the human suffering of third parties, this kind of personal
betrayal was not what they had in mind.2 °7
Although it is difficult to say with any confidence what outcome would have
resulted from a lawyer-client dialogue with either Spaulding or the insurance
company, certainly a lawyer who felt a professional duty to shape the legal
representation around the client's values as well as to protect the client's legal
interests would not have been prevented by the logic of legal objectification and
by the lawyer's self-interest that preempted the lawyer-client dialogue in the
Spaulding case.
IV. BEYOND THREE-DIMENSIONAL CLIENTS IN LEGAL ETHics
The previous Parts have argued that the problem of legal objectification poses

the Minnesota Supreme Court because they did not want to "face the justices and explain their behavior, having
made no attempt to protect the boy").
207. See LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUsntiCE, supra note 34, at 127.
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a more central and important moral and ethical problem of legal professionalism
than the conflicts between role morality and professional morality on which legal
ethics historically focused. Further, these Parts have argued that a client
value-based model of legal representation provides an antidote against both the
self-seeking client behavior that legal interests-based counseling tends to
promote and the danger of moral overreaching associated with the lawyerstatesman model. This Part examines legal representation in three contexts that
challenge the client value-based ideal of representation proposed above: the
representation of clients with diminished capacity, the representation of organizational clients, and cause lawyering. Each of the contexts examined in this Part
poses a distinct problem in defining and ascertaining client objectives, both
generally and in terms of client values. Implementing the methods of client
value-based legal representation is neither simple nor straightforward in any of
these contexts.
Even though it is not always easy to ascertain or define client objectives for
clients with diminished capacity, organizational clients, or in cause lawyering,
this Part argues that a client value-based approach to representation is still
valuable as a professional ideal to guide the behavior of lawyers. Each context
provides reasons, temptations, and opportunities for lawyers to revert to either
purely legal interest-based representation or representation shaped around the
lawyer's own values. A professional ideal that exhorts lawyers to shape
representation around client values, even when the ideal is difficult to implement
directly, provides a valuable check on lawyers' tendencies to either legally
objectify their clients or impose their own values on the representation.
A. REPRESENTING CLIENTS WITH DIMINISHED CAPACITY
When lawyers represent children, the elderly, or other clients with diminished
capacity, professional rules exhort them to "as far as reasonably possible,
maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client";2 8 however,
meeting this ideal is not always easy to achieve. Elderly, child, and developmentally disabled clients often lack the capacity to direct their lawyers. 20 9 The very
process of determining how much autonomy to allow such clients can result in
"circular lawyer-centric thinking" in which the lawyer abides by the client's
choices as long as the lawyer agrees with them and uses the client's disagreement
about the client's interests as evidence that the client lacks competency to make
an informed decision.2 10

208. MODEL RuL

R. 1.14.

209. See generally Paul R. Tremblay, On Persuasion and Paternalism:Lawyer Decisionmaking and the
Questionably Competent Client, 1987 UTAH L. REv. 515.
210. Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content of Best Interests in Client-DirectedLawyeringfor Children in
Child Protective Proceedings,64 FoRDHAm L. REy. 1505, 1509 (1996).
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One possibility for a lawyer representing a client with diminished capacity is to
act as a de facto guardian, shaping representation around what the lawyer
determines to be in the client's best interests. 21t The de facto guardian model,
however, is criticized because it provides no constraints to check lawyer
overreaching based on bias or conflicts of interest. 21 2 The problem is that what is
"best" for a child, elderly, or other impaired client often rests on a value
judgment. Allowing these judgments to be made on the basis of the lawyer's
values runs the risk of imposing lawyer values on clients whose own values
diverge from that of the lawyer. Clients are thus exposed to decision-making
based on the "the personalities, values and opinions of the randomly chosen
lawyers" in their cases.2 13
Another possibility is for the lawyer to determine an impaired client's
objectives by reference to the client's legal interests. 21 4 Legal interests-based
representation can help avoid the arbitrariness of "best interest" representation by
grounding representation decisions in objectively determined legal rights.
However, legal interests can be based on conflicting or substantively unfair
law. 21 5 Moreover, as with fully-functioning adult clients, the reduction of
impaired clients to their legal interests results in a narrow and individualistic
understanding of client objectives that overlooks significant non-legal reasons
why clients might choose not to aggressively pursue their legal rights.21 6 As
scholars writing about the role of lawyers for children have argued, the narrow
focus on legal interests overlooks social relationships that child clients may value
and can isolate them from caregivers and communities
in which they form their
2 17
bonds.
emotional
and
strongest psychological
The kind of client value-based approach to legal representation proposed in
Part III of this Article is difficult to implement directly in the case of impaired
clients. The methods of active listening and probing to determine whether a
decision is consistent with a client's deeply-held values may be difficult or
impossible to carry out with clients who are impaired in their "ability to
understand, deliberate upon, and reach conclusions about matters affecting the
client's own well-being. '2 18 For example, elderly clients may not always be

211. Tremblay, supra note 209, at 570.
212. Id. at 575.
213. Martin Guggenheim, A Paradigmfor Determining the Role of Counselfor Children, 64 FORDHAM L.
REv. 1399, 1415 (1996).
214. Id. at 1412 (arguing that when representing an impaired child client, lawyers should be guided by the
legal rights the law grants the child).
215. Annette R. Appell, Decontextualizingthe Child Client: The Efficacy of the Attorney-Client Model for
Very Young Children, 64 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1955, 1962-65 (1996) (critiquing Guggenheim's legal interest
representation proposal).
216. Tremblay, supranote 209, at 551.
217. See Annette R. Appell, Children's Voice and Justice: Lawyering for Children in the Twenty-First
Century,6 NEv. L.J. 692,699 (2006).
218. MODEL RuLES R. 1.14cmt. 1.
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lucid, or their decisions may reflect distorted priorities.2

9

Very young childrerl

may be unable to express their preferences, and even children who can express
maturity and competence to direct their lawyers in
their opinions often lack the
220
complex decision-making.
When invoked as a professional ideal rather than as a methodology, however,
client value-based representation provides a concrete goal toward which lawyers
representing diminished capacity clients can strive: to shape representation as
much as possible around the unique values of the client. This goal is already
articulated in the ethical rules governing representation of diminished capacity
clients. For example, comments on Model Rule 1.14 on diminished capacity
decision
clients suggest that lawyers can check "the consistency of a [client's]
221
with the known long-term commitments and values of the client.,
Similarly, scholars who have written thoughtfully about the nuances of
maximizing client voice and direction in situations where the clients' decisionmaking ability is impaired have recognized methods that help lawyers approximate the client's unique values. For example, Paul Tremblay has suggested that
with elderly clients, lawyers are encouraged to gather information about the
client's long-term commitments and values by consulting family members who
have "known and perhaps lived with the client for years."22' 2 With children, the
situation is different because children have "not yet reached the point in life when
their values have been revealed. 2 23 Jean Koh Peters has encouraged lawyers
who represent child clients to view client competency as a "dimmer switch" that
always allows access to some amount of information about the client's unique
individuality and allows lawyers to stay true to the interests and wishes of child
clients to whatever degree the child's individuality can be expressed.2 24
B. REPRESENTING ORGANIZATIONAL CLIENTS
Organizational clients present a different kind of challenge for a client
value-centered approach to legal representation. Like most of legal ethics, the
client-value-based approach is based on a paradigm of individual client
representation. Only natural persons, however, have hopes, dreams, fears,
loyalties, commitments, and values that fill out the dimensions of their objectives
beyond simple legal interest maximization. The question in the organizational
client context is how a lawyering model based on individual client representation
can translate to situations where the client is not a natural person. More

219. See, e.g., Paul R. Tremblay, Counseling Clients Who Weren't Born Yesterday: Age and the
Attorney-Client Relationship, 16 FAM. ADvoc. 24 (1993).
220. Guggenheim, supra note 213, at 1406-07.
221. MODEL RuLEs R. 1.14cmt. 6.
222. Tremblay, supranote 209, at 569.
223. Guggenheim, supra note 213, at 1400.
224. Id.
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particularly, the question arises whether a client value-based model makes any
sense at all in the context of organizational clients.
In the legal ethics rules governing organizational representation, the individual
client model serves as an imperfect metaphor for the representation of organizational clients. By ethical rule, lawyers for organizations are required to treat the
organization itself, a fictitious entity, as the client.225 Taken literally, this means
that the fictitious entity client must decide the objectives of the representation and
engage in the consultation required about how those objectives will be
pursued. 226 Neither ethical standards nor lawyer training, however, provide
direction on how a lawyer is to go about ascertaining the objectives of a fictitious
entity "embodied in a large and diffuse collection of people and information.' 2 27
Lawyers are directed generally to defer to the decision-making of dulyauthorized constituents of the organization, usually officers and directors, on
matters involving policy, operations, and the assessment of risk.2 28 Yet, most of
the ethical heat in the representation of organizational clients is generated by
situations in which the illegal actions of individual constituents, like managers,
expose the organizational client to substantial injury.229 In such situations, lawyers are
directed to protect the best interests of the organizational client, which brings the lawyer
back to the difficult question of how to ascertain those interests.
Potentially, the easiest way for lawyers to figure out their organizational
client's objectives, separating the interests of the organizational client from the
self-interests of managers and other constituents, is to analyze the organization's
objectives as completely congruent with the organization's legal interests. In
individual client representation, such focus on a client's legal interests may divert
lawyers away from a deeper understanding of a client's objectives. In the
organizational context, by contrast, attention to the legal interests of the
organization helps to focus lawyers on what is best for the organization rather
than the individual constituents with whom the lawyers are more likely to interact
and sympathize.
The premise that organizational clients are nothing more than the sum of their
legal interests, however, is both too facile and somewhat suspect. The premise is
too facile because organizations may well have objectives beyond the crude
maximization of their freedom, wealth, and power over others. Organizations are
complex entities with reputations, organizational cultures, relationships with
outsiders, and ties with the community that create interests beyond the

225. MODEL RULES R. 1.13(a).

226. See MODEL RULES R. 1.2(a) ("[A] lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of
representation and... shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.").
227. See Donald Langevoort, The Epistemology of Corporate Securities Lawyering: Beliefs, Biases and
OrganizationalBehavior,63 BROOK. L. REv. 629,631 (1997).
228. MODEL RuLEs R. 1.13 cmt. 3.
229. MODEL RULEs R. 1.13(b).
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maximization of their profits. 230 The argument is also suspect because it too
easily conflates the objectives of organizational clients with the profit motive of
the lawyers who represent them. Lawyers whose financial success depends on
billable hours have self-interested reasons to pursue every conceivable legal
argument at their client's expense. 231 Lawyers' legal objectification of organizational clients may thus provide a convenient rationalization for the pursuit of the
lawyer's own interests under the guise of zealous representation of client
interests.
Alternatively, it may be tempting to posit the lawyer-statesman model as a
more promising ideal for guiding lawyers' professional role in the organizational
client representation context. Responsible corporate decision-making that takes
the organization's broader interests into account requires a range of viewpoints
from both insiders who are assimilated into corporate culture and outsiders who
can challenge it. 232 Within this mix of views, lawyers can play the role of the
corporate conscience, questioning whether and how the proposed actions of the
organization comport with the public interest.23 3 Further, the more intrusive
methods of moral activist counseling do not present the same dangers of moral
overreaching in the corporate context as they do in the individual client context,
because in the corporate context, lawyers operate as one voice among many in the
organizational decision-making process.23 4

Even if it is less troubling in the organizational client context, the lawyerstatesman model poses problems of implementation in the corporate context.
Because corporate clients are more powerful and demand greater deference, the
lawyer may feel less comfortable raising explicitly moral considerations as part
of legal representation.2 35 As a result,. corporate lawyers may be less likely to

230. JOANNE MARTIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE: MAPPING THE TERRAIN 93-115 (2002) (discussing the use
of different perspectives on defining corporate culture to recognize these diverse constituencies and interests).
231. See Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, CorporateCounsel and the Elite Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REv.
277, 296-97 (1985); see also Robert Gordon, The Ethical World of Large-Firm Litigators: Preliminary
Observations, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 709, 716-18, 725-26 (1998) (noting a disjuncture between large-firm
litigators' view that clients want aggressive no-holds-barred representation and in-house counsels' view that
clients want cost-efficiency).
232. See generally Donald Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the
Unintended Consequences of Independence andAccountability, 89 GEo. L.J. 797 (2001).
233. Stephen Pepper, Lawyers' Ethics, supra note 105, at 194-95 (1999); Russell G. Pearce, The Legal
Profession as a Blue State: Reflections on Public Philosophy,Jurisprudence,and Legal Ethics, 75 FORDHAM L.

REv. 1339, 1364-65 (2006).
234. Pepper, Lawyers'Ethics,supra note 105, at 194; see also LuaAN, Human Dignity, supra note 167, at 87
(arguing for an abolishment of the lawyer-client privilege for corporations because corporations do not have
human dignity to violate by self-incriminatory disclosure).
235. Pepper, Lawyers'Ethics,supra note 105, at 194-95; Gordon, supra note 231, at 711; Mark Suchman,
Working Without a Net: The Sociology of Legal Ethics in CorporateLitigation, 67 FORDHAM L. "REv. 837,
843-44 (1998); see also LuBAN, Human Dignity, supra note 167, at 87 (acknowledging that his argument for
abolishing the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context-though strong philosophically-has been
viewed as "too fanciful to take seriously").
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engage in an explicitly moral dialogue with their clients based on the concern that
their "own view of morality" is not universally shared.2 36
Client value-based representation presents an alternative for lawyers representing organizational clients that lies somewhere between the crude assumptions of
legal interest maximization and concerns with what may seem the overly
moralistic approach of the lawyer-statesman model. As apparent in the individual
representation context, part of the purpose of client value clarification is to curb
impulsive client decision-making that may be distorted by anger, fear, or
insecurity and to ensure that legal representation furthers the client's deeper and
more fundamental values.2 37 Lawyers in the corporate context can serve a similar
function of checking the sometimes unrealistic optimism that tends to pervade
business and corporate culture by raising pragmatic concerns based on measured
and risk-averse assessments about the long-term consequences of proposed
decisions.2 3 8 Additionally, lawyers can help promote and invite their organizational clients' voluntary compliance with legal regulation by being spokespersons
with corporate management about the purposes and functions of legal regulations. 23 9 Rather than attempting a moral lecture, such pragmatic inquiries and
purposive explanations of the law invite the constituents with organizational
decision-making authority to consider the long-term goals and values of the
organization and to consider how the goals and values of the organization fit
within the structure of the legal regulations that govern corporate activity.
Empirical analysis of the attitudes and reported behavior of corporate lawyers
suggests that these lawyers often engage in some of the same counseling
techniques designed in the individual client context to probe the consistency of an
organizational client's decision with the client's deeper values. 2 ' ° For example,
researchers in one study concluded that when counseling their business clients,
lawyers tend to couch moral considerations in pragmatic or reputational

236. In the words of one large-firm litigator, explaining why he would not engage his client in a moral
dialogue: "I personally would have a problem conveying my own view of the morality of the situation to a
client. I think morality is a very slippery concept, primarily in the eye of the beholder." Robert L. Nelson, The
Discovery Process as a Circle of Blame: Institutional, Professional, and Socio-Economic Factors That
Contribute to Unreasonable, Inefficient, and Amoral Behavior in CorporateLitigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REv.
773,780 (1998).
237. See supra Part I.B.
238. Langevoort, Epistemology, supra note 227, at 49; Suchman, supra note 235, at 844 (lawyers tend to
assume that unethical behavior will carry long-term negative consequences).
239. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Someplace Between Philosophy and Economics: Legitimacy and
Good CorporateLawyering, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 1615 (2006).
240. The empirical study to which this section refers-called Ethics: Beyond the Rules-was sponsored by
the ABA Section on Litigation, and invited a team of legal scholars, legal ethics scholars, social scientists to
study large firm litigators. Robert E. Nelson, et al., Introduction:Bringing Legal Realism to the Study of Ethics
and Professionalism, 67 FoRDHAM L. RE,.697, 701 (1998). The team interviewed both partners and associates
at large law firms in two cities over extended weekends. Id. A year later, they interviewed groups of judges,
plaintiffs' counsel, and in-house counsel in the same two cities. Id. at 702. The results were published in a series
of articles in the Fordham Law Review.
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concerns, such as asking a client what a proposed course of action would'look
like on the front page of the newspaper or how it would be viewed by a judge or
the jury.2 4 1 Such appeals to reputation are not simply part of a pragmatic
cost-benefit analysis or strategy for making the lawyer's moral judgment of the
client more palatable. Rather, as Mark Suchman points out, "[tihe 'newspaper
a social lookingtest' operates much like Mead's 'generalized other'-providing
242
glass that allows one.., to see and judge oneself.
C. CAUSE LAWYERING
Finally, the representation of politically vulnerable, socially disadvantaged,
and otherwise disempowered clients presents unique challenges to a client
value-based representation, because it poses a special case of the tension between
legal interests-based representation and the dangers of moral overreaching
associated with the lawyer-statesman ideal.
In the view of some commentators, the representation of politically and
socially disempowered clients presents the most appropriate venue for a client
value-based approach to legal representation. Because of their relative lack of
legal sophistication, such clients are seen as particularly vulnerable to domination
by their lawyers.24 3 Moreover, the construction of client objectives in purely legal
terms in the poverty law context is especially pernicious because it reinforces
inequities built into the law itself. Because those without social advantage lack
the power to influence the law-making process, the law that affects their lives is
often created without taking their perspectives into account. A client value-based
approach to legal representation holds out the promise of making law more
responsive to the lived experience of clients by shaping legal representation
around the values and narratives of clients. 2 44
The conditions of poverty law practice, however, pressure poverty lawyers in
the direction of legal interest-based representation. The overwhelming need for
legal services and the relentless demands to meet the immediate and often
desperate needs of individual clients create pressures to process cases routinely
and to settle them as quickly as possible.2 45 To access the remedies that law offers
politically vulnerable or socially disadvantaged clients, lawyers must force their
clients' stories into narratives that may be disconnected from the perspectives and

241. Gordon, supra note 231, at 733; Suchman, supra note 235, at 844-45.
242. Id.
243. See O'Leary, supra note 147, at 107; Pepper, Lawyers'Ethics, supra note 105, at 194-95.
244. Anthony Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice:Learning the Lessons of Client Narrative, 100
YALE L.J. 2107, 2131-33 (1991); white, Sunday Shoes, supra note 177, at 50-51.
245. See generally Gary Bellow, Turning Solutions Into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience, 34 NAT'L
LEGAL AID & DEFENDER Ass'N BRIEFCASE 106 (1977).
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circumstances of their clients' lives.2 46 Furthermore, the pressure to meet the
unmet legal needs of individuals in poverty works against the ability of poverty
lawyers to use individual client representation to change the contours of the law.
The incentive for more powerful repeat players, like landlords, employers, and
banks, is to settle cases that might make unfavorable law, while the incentives for
one-shot individual clients are to maximize their tangible gain in the particular
case by taking the deals that they are offered.247
Moreover, the typical client value-based methods of overcoming legal
interest-based representation through active listening and probing for client
values are arguably insufficient'to overcome the barriers created by social
subordination. Even when poverty lawyers attempt to attend more holistically to
the values of fewer individual clients, such as in law school clinic settings, the
individual focus of representation in discrete cases has a tendency to isolate the
client's objectives from the collective and community values required for reform
of unjust laws and systems.24 8 In addition, clients who seek legal services are
often in crisis situations of eviction from housing, denial of benefits for life
necessities, loss of parental rights, or deportation. Attention to the unique needs
of such individual clients will often be synonymous with getting whatever
remedy the law offers to alleviate the crisis.
To escape the endless grind of remedying injustice one client at a time, lawyers
for politically and socially disadvantaged clients engage in what Stuart Scheingold and Austin Sarat call "cause lawyering. ' 24 9 In cause lawyering, the
representation of individual clients is a means to the achievement of political
ends that transcend the individual clients' financial or legal interests.25 ° Cause
lawyers choose or recruit clients to fit the needs of the cause and put the needs of
the cause over the needs of the individual clients who represent the class for
whom the lawyers advocate. 25 1 Although the needs of individuals are subordinated to collective goals, the promise of cause lawyering is to effect reforms that
will improve conditions for2 entire classes of persons affected by injustice
25
embedded in the law itself.
Cause lawyers are arguably a special embodiment of the lawyer-statesman

246. See Alfieri, Client Narrative, supra note 244, at 2112-13; White, Sunday Shoes, supra note 177, at
27-29.
247. Marc Galanter, The Duty Not To Deliver Legal Services, 30 U. MIAMI L. REV. 929,938-40 (1976).
248. Sameer Ashar, Law Clinics and Collective Mobilization, 14 CLINIcAL L. REV. 355, 357-58 (2008); see
also William H. Simon, Homo-Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal Formalism, 32 STAN. L. REV. 487,
496-505 (1980).
249. See STUART A. SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: POLITICS, PROFESSIONALISM
AND CAUSE LAWYERING

(2006).

250. Id. at 6-7.
251. LuBAN, LAWYERS AND JUsTIcE, supra note 34, at 317.

252. Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for Clients to Speak, 16
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 535, 535-37 (1987-88).
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ideal.25 3 The relative independence from client control and the ability to define
and pursue public interest goals directly are consonant with the ideal of the
lawyer who mediates between the client's interests and the public good. As
cause lawyers are "advocates not only, or primarily,
Scheingold and Sarat state it,
for their clients but for causes and, one might say, for their own beliefs. 25 4
The dangers of moral overreaching associated with the lawyer-statesman ideal,
however, also assert themselves in the context of cause lawyering. Perhaps the
quintessential example of cause lawyering is the NAACP's campaign to
desegregate public schools.2 55 This campaign involved both a carefullyorchestrated legal challenge that resulted in the historic 1954 ruling in Brown v.
Board of Education256 and a persistent decades-long effort to enforce and
implement Brown through litigation in lower federal courts.2 57 As Derrick Bell
argued in one of the earliest critiques of Civil Rights lawyering, however, the
lawyers' pursuit of the goal of desegregatedschools became disconnected from
the goal of better quality education that desegregation was designed to achieve. 2 8
Committed to the symbolic importance of desegregation, beholden to their middleclass donors, and disconnected from the experience of inner-city black families,
national-level NAACP lawyers opposed local efforts by community groups and parents
to structure settlements that would retain segregated school systems and require
the investment of resources to improve the quality of inner-city schools.25 9
In the context of cause lawyering, a client value-based model of representation
presents itself not so much as a method of representing individual clients, but as a
professional ideal or "theory of practice" around which lawyers representing
socially and politically disadvantaged clients can strive to shape their representation.260 The strategies of a new generation of lawyers practicing law for socially
and politically disadvantaged clients seek greater participation from clients in the
formation of collective goals, while at the same time recognizing that the clients'
capacity for voicing collective values may have to be consciously created, rather
than merely received.2 6 1 Lucie White, for example, recounts ways to create space

253. See, e.g., LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supranote 34, at 237-38 (connecting the Brandeis vision of the
"people's lawyer" with public interest law practice); see also SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, supra note 249, at 9-17
(exploring the continuities and discontinuities of cause lawyering and the lawyer-statesman ideal).
254. Id. at 9.
255. Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, What Cause Lawyers Do For, and To, Social Movements: An
Introduction,in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENtrS 1,4-7 (Sarat & Scheingold eds., 2006).
256. Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
257. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
DesegregationLitigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470,472-82 (1976).
258. Id. at 487-88.
259. Id. at 487-93.
260. Ascanio Piomelli, Appreciating CollaborativeLawyering, 6 CLINICAL L. REv.427, 429-31 (2000).
261. For example, see generally GERALD LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CIICANO'S VISION OF
The Antinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992); Anthony V. Alfieri,

DialogicEmpowerment, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 659 (1987-88).
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in the "margins" of a lawsuit for class members to discover and define a
collective voice through speak-out events or street theater.2 62 Lawyers also have
formed alliances with community organizing groups, often playing a subordinate
role in the definition of the legal services that would benefit the larger social
movement.26 3 These strategies seek to avoid the disengagement from client
values that may result when the lawyer defines the "public interest" in isolation
from the values and perspectives of the clients. 2 4
CONCLUSION

The debates in theoretical legal ethics center around the way lawyers' roles should be
conceived, and they both arise from and help define the way lawyers practice law. The
early legal ethics scholars sought a definition of lawyers' professional "role morality"
that would serve the theoretical purpose of generating conflicts between role morality
and ordinary morality; however, in starting from the standpoint of theory, this Article
argues, they misinterpreted practice. The lawyer behavior that looked to them like the
overindulgence of client interests was really a different phenomenon. The behavior was
really the lawyers' own legal objectification of their clients: the narrow construction of
client objectives in terms of legal interests and disengagement from client values. As a
result of misdiagnosing the problems that plagued legal professionalism, legal ethics
scholars proposed a solution, the "lawyer-statesman" model, which aggravates the
problem of lawyer disengagement from client values by encouraging lawyers to shape
legal representation around the lawyer's conception of morality and the public interest.
The client value-based approach to representation that this Article proposes
asserts a faith in client values as a corrective force for both the anti-social aspects
of legal interest maximization and the hubris of the lawyer-statesman ideal.
Attention to client values may not, in the end, provide salvation from the
competitive and self-interested culture of American society. If, however,
competition and self-interest are culturally pervasive, reliance on lawyers to
transcend this cultural tendency by appealing to their own personal values is just
as idealistic a dream. The goal of shaping representation around the values of
clients provides an opportunity for legal representation to redeem itself without
compromising the core values of client loyalty and service that lie at the heart of
legal professionalism. Before the legal community abandons the professional
values of client loyalty and service, lawyers should attempt to actually represent
their clients, rather than zealously pursue their clients' legal interests.
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